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Abstract  
 
This research report explores the relationship between state fragility and the 
hosting of refugees in the context of the protracted Afghan refugee crisis, 
where fragile state Pakistan hosts Afghan refugees.  
The reality for the majority of the world’s refugees is that their hosts are 
neighbouring countries which are in varying conditions of state fragility. Some 
states are bearing the brunt of the global refugee burden despite their general 
struggle to provide basic services and livelihood opportunities for their own 
citizens. For these ‘fragile hosts’, providing for an influx of refugees would be 
untenable without significant international assistance.  
Following a comprehensive literature review looking at the complex interplay 
between conflict, state fragility, underdevelopment and forced migration, the 
report case study is prefaced by background chapters surveying the factors 
which triggered Afghan forced migration, and Pakistan’s fragile status as host 
respectively. This report then offers an analysis of two region-specific 
UNHCR documents which explores the relationship between Afghan refugees 
and Pakistan as ‘fragile host’.  
Various host-state incapacities were found to entrench endemic poverty and 
insecurity in the Afghan refugee population in Balochistan due to a lack of 
livelihood opportunities, and availability and access to quality services. These 
issues have also created barriers to local refugee integration, and the 
fluctuating interest of international donors has historically served to exacerbate 
these challenges. This report argues that a much-improved understanding of 
the multi-layered and complex regional, national and local relationships 
between protracted conflict, state fragility and refugee-host dynamics is 
needed in order to approach a sustainable solution. 
iii 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements  
 
 
To my family, particularly my wife Shamsia without whose tremendous and 
consistent patience during the entire process, I wouldn’t have finished. And to 
my mokos, Umar and Aaliyah, who have probably been put off academia 
entirely but at least now know something about refugees. 
Thanks to my supervisor, Dr Maria Borovnik for her positive support, 
encouragement, and enthusiasm, which helped keep the light flickering at the 
end of the tunnel.  
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 2.1:  Origin and Number of Refugees Hosted by the Top Five Host 
Countries and the Duration of their Situations ................................................... 25 
Table 5.1: Document Analysis Themes and Search Terms as they relate to 
Research Questions ................................................................................................. 78 
 
  
v 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: A Picture of Global Forced Migration in 2015. ................................. 3 
Figure 1.2: Percentage Breakdown of the Top 10 Refugee Host Countries and 
their Relative State Fragility. ..................................................................................... 6 
Figure 2.1: Conflict as a Driver for Mutually Reinforced Conditions of State 
Fragility, Forced Displacement and Underdevelopment .................................... 19 
Figure 2.2: The Conflict/Violence - Human Development - State Fragility 
Nexus: Overlap of the 50 Lowest Performing Countries, 2015 ........................ 22 
Figure 3.2: UNHCR Afghan 'Persons of Concern' in Relation to Afghan 
Population – 2015 .................................................................................................... 37 
Figure 3.3: Afghanistan Conflict Timeline and Refugee Movement to Iran and 
Pakistan from 1979-2015 ........................................................................................ 41 
Figure 3.4: Afghan Refugees and Returnees from Pakistan and Iran, and 
Internally Displaced Persons - 1989–2014. .......................................................... 43 
Figure 3.5: UNHCR Afghan Refugee Assistance: UNHCR Total Annual 
Expenditure, 1999–2015 ......................................................................................... 48 
Figure 4.2: Religious Groups in Pakistan .............................................................. 60 
Figure 4.3: Ethno-Linguistic Groups in Pakistan. ............................................... 61 
  
vi 
 
Acronyms 
 
DFID Department for International Development (UK) 
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
FSI Fragile States Index 
GoP Government of Pakistan 
IOM International Organisation for Migration 
MDGs Millennium Development Goals 
NADRA National Database & Registration Authority 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 
PNA Participatory Needs Assessment 
PoR Proof of Registration 
RAHA Refugee Affected Host Areas 
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals 
SSAR Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees 
WFP World Food Programme 
 
  
vii 
 
  
viii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ii 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................iii 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................. iv 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................. v 
Acronyms ................................................................................................................... vi 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER ONE:  Report Introduction ................................................................ 2 
1.1 The Global Crisis of Contemporary Forced Migration ......................... 2 
1.2 The Trouble with the Majority of Refugee Hosts .................................. 5 
1.3 Legislating the Refugee Label ................................................................... 7 
1.4 Out of the Fire, Into the Fry Pan: The Refugee-Fragile State Nexus . 8 
1.5 Research Questions, Methodology, and Limitations ........................... 10 
1.6 Consideration of Ethics and Biases ........................................................ 11 
1.7 Report Structure........................................................................................ 12 
CHAPTER TWO:  State Fragility, Conflict, and Protracted Refugee 
Protection in the 21st Century ............................................................................... 14 
2.1 Chapter Introduction ............................................................................... 14 
2.2 Defining State Fragility ............................................................................ 15 
2.3 Conflict as Stimulus for State Fragility, Underdevelopment, and 
Forced Displacement .......................................................................................... 19 
2.4 Protracted Conflict as the Key Driver for Protracted Refugee 
Displacement ........................................................................................................ 24 
2.5 Protection and Solutions for Refugees in Protracted Situations ........ 26 
ix 
 
2.6 The Global Refugee Burden ................................................................... 29 
2.7 Chapter Conclusion .................................................................................. 30 
CHAPTER THREE:  Afghan Refugees in Crisis: Conflict, Protracted State 
Fragility, and the Humanitarian Response ............................................................ 32 
3.1 Chapter Introduction ............................................................................... 32 
3.2 Afghanistan: An Archetype of State Fragility ....................................... 34 
3.3 Driven from Home: Protracted Conflict, Protracted Fragility, 
Displacement and Return ................................................................................... 36 
3.3.1 The Tragic Carousel of Conflict in Afghanistan ........................... 36 
3.3.2 Afghan Conflict-Forced Migration Patterns ................................. 40 
3.4 Good Neighbours: The Global and Regional Response to the Afghan 
Refugee Crisis ....................................................................................................... 44 
3.4.1 The International and Regional Response to Afghan Forced 
Migration ........................................................................................................... 44 
3.4.2 Competing Global Crises, Funding Fluctuations, and Fragile 
Solutions ........................................................................................................... 47 
3.4.3 The Status Quo of Afghan Forced Displacement and the Refugee 
Repatriation Solution ...................................................................................... 49 
3.5 Chapter Conclusion .................................................................................. 50 
CHAPTER FOUR:  Framing a Fragile State: The Case of Pakistan ................ 52 
4.1 Chapter Introduction ............................................................................... 52 
4.2 A Fragile Birth: The Political Realisation of Pakistan, Partition and 
Violent Beginnings............................................................................................... 53 
4.2.1 The Road to Partition ....................................................................... 53 
x 
 
4.2.2 The Legacy of Partition: Violence and the Unjust Apportionment 
of India’s Resources ........................................................................................ 55 
4.3 The Fragile State of 21st Century Pakistan ........................................... 57 
4.3.1 Fragility Based on Services Entitlements Failures ........................ 59 
4.3.2 Fragility Based upon Government Legitimacy Failures ............... 64 
4.3.3. Fragility based upon State Authority Failures ............................... 67 
4.4 Chapter Conclusion .................................................................................. 71 
CHAPTER FIVE:  Document Analysis: the Solutions Strategy for Afghan 
Refugees and Participatory Needs Assessment of Afghan Refugees in 
Balochistan ................................................................................................................ 74 
5.1 Chapter Introduction ............................................................................... 74 
5.2 Document Selection and Suitability ....................................................... 75 
5.3 Document Analysis Method ................................................................... 76 
5.4. Context and Purposes of the Documents ............................................. 79 
5.4.1 Participatory Needs Assessment of Afghan Refugees in 
Balochistan 2014 .............................................................................................. 79 
5.4.2 Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees Regional Overview: 
Update 2015-2016 ........................................................................................... 80 
5.5. Theme One: Pakistan as Fragile State and Refugee Host ................... 81 
5.5.1 Participatory Needs Assessment (2014) Analysis: Lacking 
Livelihood Opportunities and Endemic Poverty ........................................ 82 
5.5.2 Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (2015) Analysis: Poverty 
and Insecurity of Afghan Returnees ............................................................. 84 
5.6 Theme Two: Settlement in Host Country as an Option for Refugees
 85 
xi 
 
5.6.1 Participatory Needs Assessment (2014) Analysis: Access to basic 
services and the village-urban divide ............................................................. 85 
5.6.2 Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (2015) Analysis: Access 
to basic services and community capacity building ..................................... 88 
5.7 Theme Three: International Support for Pakistan in Protecting 
Afghan Refugees .................................................................................................. 90 
5.7.1 Participatory Needs Assessment (2014) Analysis: Refugee needs, 
not overarching solutions strategy ................................................................. 90 
5.7.2 Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (2015) Analysis: 
International Donor Contributions and Alleviating Refugee Host Burden
 91 
5.8 Chapter Conclusion .................................................................................. 93 
CHAPTER SIX:  The Relationship between Pakistan’s State Fragility and its 
Role as Host to Afghan Refugees: Conclusions .................................................. 96 
6.1 Chapter Introduction ............................................................................... 96 
6.2 Fight or Flight: Causes of the Refugee Influx into Pakistan ............... 97 
6.3 Stretched to Breaking Point: How Pakistan Copes as Host to Afghan 
Refugees ................................................................................................................ 99 
6.4 Either a Drip or a Waterfall: International Community Support for 
Pakistan as Afghan Refugee Host ................................................................... 104 
6.5 Report Conclusions and Recommendations ....................................... 106 
References ............................................................................................................... 110 
 
1 
 
  
2 
 
CHAPTER ONE:  
Report Introduction   
 
1.1 The Global Crisis of Contemporary Forced 
Migration 
  
Forced migration represents one of the foremost global challenges of the 
twenty-first century. Forced migrants who are driven from their homes 
increasingly find safer havens in neighbouring countries which are only 
marginally less tenuous than their own. In order to better protect 
refugees in this situation, a better understanding of the ways state 
fragility impede refugee protection and assistance is needed. This report 
aims to explore this to explore the relationship between state fragility and 
the hosting of refugees in the context of Afghan forced migration to 
Pakistan.  
 
The term ‘forced migrant’ describes a person who is compelled towards 
a change of residence away from their place of citizenship, cultural 
centre, or ‘roots’ arising from natural or man-made disasters to preserve 
their safety. Forced migration can occur within borders causing internal 
displacement or across borders creating refugees (Wood, 1994, p. 607; 
(IOM, 2015, p. 1). At the time of writing, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate represented in figure 1.1 
below painted a stark picture. The number of forced migrants worldwide 
has reached nearly 55 million; with internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
being the largest category of people served by the UNHCR (61%), 
followed by refugees and those in ‘refugee like’ situations persons 
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(27%)1, stateless persons (7%), asylum seekers (3%), and finally, others 
of concern (2%) (UNHCR, 2015i, p. 8).  
 
 
Figure 1.1: A Picture of Global Forced Migration in 2015.  Source: 
UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2014, (UNHCR, 2015i, p. 8) 
 
The specific factors that drive people to escape their homes vary widely. 
Some flee life-threatening situations such as conflict, persecution, human 
rights violations or generalised violence, whilst others are forced out by 
threats to livelihood such as adverse climatological changes and natural 
disasters (Majodina, 2009p. 3; Moore & Shellman, 2004). Some are 
trafficked or ‘coerced’ away, while others are displaced as a result of 
development projects (Martin, 2010, p. 15).  Scholars argue that 
economic migrants also qualify as ‘forced’, or ‘survival migrants’ (Gzesh, 
2008; Betts A., 2013), driven from failed or fragile sites of origin seeking 
                                              
1 This refugee figure excludes the 5.1 million Palestinian refugees registered with the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) 
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better economic chances across borders. Alarmingly however, the vast 
majority of the world’s increasing number of forced displaced and 
refugees are made so as a result of “persecution, conflict, generalized 
violence, or human rights violations” (UNHCR, 2015b, p. 2).  
 
The 21st century has seen a dramatic rise in ‘multi-causal’ and 'mixed' 
migration flows of both forced and voluntary migrants, along with 
related unpredictable patterns, scale, and processes of these population 
movements (Zetter R. , 2015a, p. 4). These movements have placed 
tremendous pressure on host and transit countries. From the beginning 
of the century, threats to national security such as attacks by non-state 
actors have been met with the erosion of asylum space through the 
securitisation of borders which can block refugees’ rights (Fekete, 2005, 
p. 40), and a reduction of aid donations to assist refugees (Schmelz, 
2012, p. 166; Todeschini, 2012). For example in late 2000, Pakistan 
officially closed its borders to new Afghan refugee arrivals and forced 
some to repatriate at odds with the international legal principle of non-
refoulement (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2001, p. 5). 
These patterns are evident in the current refugee crisis facing Europe 
where complex mixed population movements comprised of refugees, 
asylum seekers, and economic migrants and other migrants travelling 
along similar routes using similar means (Altai Consulting, 2015, p. 13).  
 
By contrast, dire economic conditions, human rights violations, and new 
and on-going protracted conflicts in the global South continue to drive 
unprecedented numbers of refugees to seek protection in neighbouring 
developing countries and elsewhere. Forced migrants who resided 
elsewhere prior to pushing towards Europe had migrated onward due to 
inadequate and unsustainable circumstances such as “high cost of living 
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and recent reductions to humanitarian aid, a lack of employment 
opportunities, restrictive regulatory barriers, and inadequate access to 
services such as healthcare and education” (REACH, 2015, p. 7). With 
the rise of national security concerns in the donor north, leading to the 
evaporation of asylum space and reduction in aid, refugees are finding 
few welcome mats and fewer open doors for permanent settlement. 
 
1.2 The Trouble with the Majority of Refugee Hosts 
 
 
Compounding the tragedy of forced migration outlined above is that the 
majority of refugees are hosted in countries which exhibit a mixture of 
vulnerabilities making them ‘fragile states’ (UNHCR, 2015h, p. 7).  This 
is illustrated in figure 1.2 below which shows that approximately 57% of 
refugees worldwide are hosted in just ten countries.  Each of these host 
countries exhibits varying levels of state fragility and is coded with a 
Fragile States Index (FSI) ranking and corresponding risk status. This is 
calculated based on an average score across eleven categories of state 
weakness (The Fund for Peace, 2015, p. 4). As illustrated below, Pakistan 
is the 13th most fragile state in the world ‘high alert’ status, along with 
being host the second largest proportion (11%) of refugees under 
UNHCR mandate globally. Turkey hosts the most refugees (13%) and is 
considered marginally fragile with ‘warning’ status along with Jordan. 
The remaining refugee host countries are also fragile with statuses 
ranging from ‘high warning’ to ‘very high alert’2. 
 
                                              
2 It should be noted that many countries hosting the remaining refugees outside of the top ten 
host states could also be fragile, such as Iraq which hosts nearly three hundred thousand 
refugees (UNHCR, Mid-Year Trends, 2015), and is the 12th most fragile state in the world with 
‘high alert’ status (The Fund for Peace, 2015, p 8). 
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Figure 1.2: Percentage Breakdown of the Top 10 Refugee Host 
Countries and their Relative State Fragility.  Source: Adapted from 
the percentage of refugees in each country (UNHCR, 2015i, p. 8), and the Fund 
for Peace, 2015, p. 7) 
 
 
The reality that the majority of the world’s refugees are hosted in states 
considered fragile, with many in protracted situations of five years or more 
(UNHCR, 2015b, p. 11) compounds the already dire circumstances of 
refugees and creates immense challenges for international refugee 
protection systems. The multi-layered difficulties associated with fragile 
states hosting refugees, along with the typically regional character of such 
fragility affects the host’s and humanitarian organisation’s ability to 
protect and assist refugees. 
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1.3 Legislating the Refugee Label 
 
Prior to the formation of the United Nations in 1948, the term ‘refugee’ 
generally described a person who had ‘sought refuge’ (FMO, 2010, p. 1). 
The advent of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees in 1951 created the international normative legal and policy 
framework which would guide refugee protection in the post-World War 
II era (Zetter, 2015a, p. 5).  
 
The UN Convention is the cornerstone legal document defining 
refugees, explaining their rights, and the legal obligations of states in 
assisting them (United Nations, 1950). The classical definition of a 
refugee given by the UN Convention outlines that a ‘refugee’ must 
forcibly reside outside the country of their nationality. The UN 
Convention gives possible reasons for this where refugees, unable to find 
safety at home, fear being “persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” 
(UNHCR, 2011b: Article 1, p. 14).  
 
Convention obligations come into effect for a signatory country after an 
asylum seeker, or person in a refugee-like situation enters (UNHCR, 
2015b, p. 12). Now labelled a ‘refugee’ and imbued with international 
legal status, including human rights, the host country has a duty of care 
towards them. A cornerstone of these obligations is ‘non-refoulement’, 
or not returning refugees to a situation of possible harm. With the legal 
status of refugees clearly mandated, they are entitled to the protection of 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), whereas 
other forced migrants can remain legally adrift, effectively leaving 
sending, transition, and receiving states without obligation to act beyond 
their own interests. In 2016, 142 states had ratified the Convention and 
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its 1967 Protocol and committed to the protection of refugees (UNHCR, 
2011c).  
 
1.4 Out of the Fire, Into the Fry Pan: The Refugee-
Fragile State Nexus 
 
The majority of refugees are hosted in the global South, in countries that 
are considered to be fragile. The term ‘fragile state’ does not have a fully 
agreed-upon definition, or a set of universally congruent measurement 
indices. However, academics and key international organisations hold 
similar overarching views of what state fragility means, with particular 
consensus on the negative effects state fragility has on human rights 
(Englehart, 2009). According to the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (2012a), a state can be considered fragile 
when its government cannot, or will not deliver core service functions to 
the majority of residents due to insufficient capacity (OECD, 2012). The 
definitional framework of state fragility used throughout this report is 
that put forward by Stewart and Brown (2009) where state fragility 
comprises governance failures of authority, service entitlements 
provision, and legitimacy (p. 10).  
 
Firstly, authority failure is characterised by the inability of government to 
protect all people residing within its territory, control borders and 
territory (DFID UK, 2005, p. 8), and establish rule of law and an equal-
access justice system (OECD, 2015, p. 20). Secondly, service entitlements 
failure reveals government incapacity to ensure that all citizens have 
access to a range of basic services such as health, education, water and 
sanitation, transport, energy infrastructure, and economic opportunities 
(Stewart & Brown, 2010, p. 10). Service entitlements failure can also be 
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characterised by weaknesses in public resource management to promote 
livelihood opportunities and the reduction of poverty (OECD, 2015, p. 
40), and economic, social and political inclusion through the 
development of effective, transparent and accountable institutions and 
policies (OECD, 2012, p. 35; DFID UK, 2005, p. 8). Finally, legitimacy 
failures exist when governments are not subject to control mechanisms 
through political regulations or legislation (DFID UK, 2005, p. 8). 
Limited support among the people and the exclusion of some groups 
from political processes also characterises state legitimacy failures, 
particularly when states are controlled by the military either directly or 
through a dominating interest in the government (Stewart & Brown, 
Fragile States, 2010, p. 20). The prevalence of poverty is a marker of 
state fragility, and in most cases fragility can be linked directly or 
indirectly to conflict (OECD, 2012; Naude et al, 2011, p. 6). 
 
When state incapacity means that the support and management of 
refugee influxes is impossible alone, cooperation with the UNHCR 
becomes mandatory. This can cause duplication of policies and services 
aimed at refugees or potentially create a parallel ‘pseudo-state’. By 
cooperating to install the UNHCR as a ‘surrogate state’ in order to 
promote more effective protection of refugee rights and clarify where 
institutional remits begin and end (Kagan, 2011, p. 27; Moulin & Nyers, 
2007), state policy towards refugees can become unclear. Protracted 
refugee situations in fragile states can negatively impact local host 
populations who have limited access to basic needs. When international 
refugee organisations provide for refugees and not local host 
communities, refugees can be placed at further risk (see Chambers, 1986, 
and Aukot, 1992). 
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Host state fragility has a major influence upon the approach taken by 
actors in relation to refugee protection, assistance, and strategising 
sustainable solutions (UNHCR, 2015b, p. 19). State fragility through 
government failures of authority, capacity to deliver services 
entitlements, and legitimacy in the majority of refugee host states 
ultimately compounds already difficult situations for refugees (Ghani & 
Lockhart, 2008). When a fragile host state is barely able to provide a 
modicum of basic needs to its own citizens, limited absorption capacity 
for additional refugee populations increases pressure; and without 
sustained international assistance, little can be expected from fragile 
states towards their ‘tolerated guests’ (Chatty, 2010, p. 37).  
 
1.5 Research Questions, Methodology, and 
Limitations 
 
In order to explore the relationship between state fragility and the 
hosting of refugees in the context of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, this 
report centres around three key questions. The first question asks what 
the cause(s) of the refugee influx to Pakistan are and seeks to explain the 
causes of refugee flight from Afghanistan and why Pakistan is the main 
destination of Afghan refugees. The second question asks how Pakistan 
copes as host to Afghan refugees through contextualisation of Pakistan 
as a ‘fragile state’, the general situation of refugees in Pakistan, and how 
the Government of Pakistan supports refugees. The final question 
explores how Pakistan is supported by the international community to 
bear its refugee hosting burden through an exploration of the assistance 
given to Pakistan by the international community. 
 
This research report relies on a qualitative desk-based approach which 
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reviews a wide range of literature aimed at exploring interrelated 
concepts pertinent to understanding both state fragility and refugees in 
protracted situations. Sources will include documents from a range of 
relevant academic disciplines, policy institutions, government agencies, 
and individual authors. The case study of Pakistan as host to Afghan 
refugees is used to provide a refugee-host context. This context was 
chosen for its intersecting characteristics of high state fragility and 
protracted host burden. A more specific qualitative document analysis is 
included of a Participatory Needs Assessment of Afghan Refugees in 
Balochistan (PNA, 2014) and the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees 
Regional Overview Update (SSAR, 2015). 
 
Limitations of this research are that it is desk-based and therefore 
entirely reliant on preceding and accessible research done by others. This 
means that the body of works drawn from have already been interpreted 
by other researchers. In addition, the available literature is only accessible 
by this researcher in English which therefore excludes material in 
languages which could be relevant to the case study site of Pakistan, such 
as Urdu. The limited document analysis sample size of only two official 
UNHCR documents for analysis is also a limitation, as is the fact that 
they originate from the same international organisation. 
 
1.6 Consideration of Ethics and Biases 
 
All research processes require an ethical approach in order to ensure the 
best chance that the integrity of the research will be upheld. In the case 
of this research project, ethical considerations are guided by the Massey 
University Code of Ethical Conduct for Research, Teaching and 
Evaluations Involving Human Participants (Massey University, 2014). 
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The desk-based nature of this research project means that there is no 
requirement to obtain Massey University Human Ethics committee 
approval. However, as O’Leary (2014) points out, the personal position 
of the researcher cannot be taken for granted as no researcher is 
unbiased by carry their own set of beliefs and perspectives.  
 
As a researcher, I aim to follow the above guidance and maintain 
consideration of my personal research position in order to be aware of 
any confirmation bias around research findings. This includes my ethnic 
position as a white New Zealander, gender position as a male, and 
religious position as a Sunni Muslim. I have endeavoured to obtain 
documents by way of ethical and official means so that the material used 
to research and inform this report is academically sound, and available.  
 
1.7 Report Structure 
 
Following this contextual introduction, chapter two is a review of the 
relevant literature, centred on state fragility and its relationship to 
conflict, protracted displacement, and underdevelopment. Chapter three 
comprises the first of two background chapters related to the case study 
of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, paying particular attention to the 
conflicts which triggered and sustain the Afghan refugee situation in 
Pakistan. Chapter four gives an overview of Pakistan as a fragile host 
state, along with the humanitarian response to the refugee crisis. Chapter 
five comprises the analysis of documents and describes the findings of 
this report as they relate to the document analysis. Finally, the discussion 
and conclusion will summarise and draw together the ideas in this report, 
and offer conclusions and recommendations for further study. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
State Fragility, Conflict, and Protracted Refugee 
Protection in the 21st Century 
 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
As explained in the report introduction above, the majority of refugees 
originate in the developing world and are hosted in fragile states. 
Refugees typically seek protection from threats such as conflict, 
persecution, natural disasters, and increasingly dire economic situations, 
creating ‘mixed migration’ flows. Generally, such driving factors of 
displacement in origin countries are felt regionally, along with at least 
some of the complex factors of underdevelopment. Citing security risks 
and debates around ‘mixed’ refugee flows, where economic migrants 
intersperse with refugees fleeing conflict and human rights abuses 
(among other drivers), potential host countries have presided over a 
shrinking of asylum space, particularly in the North (Loescher G. , 
Milner, Newman, & Troeller, 2008). This has undermined the idea of 
global ‘burden sharing’ outlined by the 1951 UN Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees (Zetter, 2015; Betts A, 2006).  
 
Through a broad range of literature, this chapter aims to explore some of 
the key concepts surrounding state fragility including framing it in terms 
of governance and service provisions failures. Following this, the 
mutually-reinforcing relationship between conflict, state fragility, and 
underdevelopment is discussed, along with the association it has to 
protracted forced displacement. This chapter also explores the inherent 
difficulties in protecting and repatriating protracted refugees in fragile 
situations, particularly in the context of an absence of livelihood 
opportunities. Finally, the idea of refugee crises as a global shared burden 
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is discussed.  
 
2.2 Defining State Fragility 
 
The problem of state fragility is at the foundation of an international 
systemic crisis, significantly impacting the pervasiveness of global 
poverty, and representing one of the most serious 21st century challenges 
to global stability (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008, p. 4) (Fukuyama, 2004) 
(Putzel & Di John, 2012) (Patrick, 2007). According to recent OECD 
(2015) predictions, poverty is likely to become increasingly concentrated 
in fragile states, where under the best-case scenario, 62% of the world’s 
poor will be located in fragile states by 2030 (p. 21). Development 
options are also limited in fragile states as “the fragility of a state prevents 
it from applying the tools of development, such as the effective use of 
aid” (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009, p. 4). Addressing the needs of 
fragile states, therefore, is of central concern to the post-2015 Millennium 
Development Goals, 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development agenda 
(ASD2030) (OECD, 2015, p. 13; United Nations, 2016). In order to 
unpick the idea of the ‘fragile state’ the concept of the ‘state’ must briefly 
be looked at.  
 
Classical definitions of the ‘state’ are multi-dimensional and rely upon 
three principal elements. Firstly, a state has a defined territory. Secondly, 
a state is organised under an ‘effective public authority’ (government) 
with internal sovereignty or fundamental power, including the legitimate 
ability to define a constitution and monopolise the use of force (Weber, 
1978, p. 54). Thirdly, a state exhibits formal external sovereignty (not 
formally subordinate to another state) (Jessop, 2016, p. 37). In an 
international legal sense, a ‘state’ is considered “the final arbiter of 
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internal, external, and boundary questions” (Abizadeh, 2010, p. 147), and 
a ‘legal person’ subject to international law (Robinson, 2013, p. 560).  
 
In human rights terms, the enfranchisement of an individual not only 
begins with, but is dependent upon, their state-affiliated identity. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) advances that state-based 
social and economic security and inter-state cooperation are the basis for 
the achievement of a dignified individual human existence (United 
Nations, 1948, Article 22). States are relied upon to negotiate the 
necessary economic, social and security conditions which facilitate a 
dignified human existence. When states fail to achieve this, in basic 
terms, they can be considered fragile. 
 
A unified and unanimous definition of state fragility has yet to be 
formulated despite the profusion of literature covering a range of related 
aspects, including general concepts (Jones, 2008; Kaplan, 2008), case 
studies (Call and Wyeth, 2008; Rotberg, 2003), and correlation and 
causality studies (Bratton and Chang, 2006; (Englehart, 2009). State 
fragility is a multidimensional concept and involves a complex network of 
political interactions, historical patterns of economic development and 
social characteristics, including conflicts, which have eroded a state’s 
ability to function normatively (Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum, 2012, 
p.2; Hameiri, 2007; Kaplan, 2008, p. 36; Marshall, 2008). State fragility 
does develop or occur in isolation but is generated in the context of 
transnational economic and political relations which links fragile states to 
non-fragile states and other fragile states regionally and internationally 
(Duffield, 2001, p. 165; Christoplos & Hilhorst, 2009, p. 12). 
 
Multinational donor agencies consider state fragility as shifting points on 
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a continuum between state robustness and failure (OECD, 2012, p. 15), 
and have settled on an approximate description of what it means for a 
state to be ‘fragile’. This description centres upon the ability or 
willingness of a state’s institutions and governance structure to 
sufficiently provide service entitlements to the state’s population (DFID 
UK, 2005, p. 14; OECD, 2012, p. 15). For the purposes of this report, 
Stewart and Brown’s (2009) working definition of state fragility provides 
an analytical framework centred upon the degree to which states fail to 
meet a set of three broad functions:  authority, delivery of service 
entitlements, and legitimacy (p. 9; Carment, et al, 2010; Naude, et al, 
2011). These are briefly explained below.  
 
Authority Failures  
Lack of authority contributes to fragility when states are unable to 
establish a rule of law at the national and international levels, where high 
levels of criminality can continue in the absence of a working, equal-
access justice system (OECD, 2015, p. 20). Inability to protect the 
people residing within their borders against organised communal or 
political violence, including deliberately leaving particular groups 
unprotected is also considered failure of state authority (Stewart & 
Brown, Fragile States, 2010, p. 10). State authority is also unqualified in 
the absence of clear international sovereign status where the state cannot 
control either its borders or significant parts of its territory (DFID UK, 
2005, p. 8; Kreutzmann, 2008, p. 203). 
 
Services Entitlements Failures 
Lack of service provision capacity contributes to fragility when states are 
unable to ensure that all citizens have access to a range of basic quality 
services such as health, education, water and sanitation, transport, energy 
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infrastructure, and economic opportunities (Stewart & Brown, Fragile 
States, 2010). Service entitlements failures are linked to state inability to 
manage public affairs such as public finances to promote progress 
towards growth and the reduction of poverty (Putzel & Di John, 2012, p. 
xi), and the promotion of economic, social and political inclusion 
through the development of effective, transparent and accountable 
institutions and policies (OECD, 2012, p. 35). Capacity to mitigate the 
prevalence of illicit financial flows including corruption, and the combat 
of organised crime is linked to service entitlements failures and causes 
state fragility. (DFID UK, 2005, p. 8). Inadequate state planning causing 
adaptive incapacity also reduces exposure and vulnerability to climate-
related extreme events and other economic, social, and environmental 
shocks and disasters (OECD, 2015, p. 40). 
 
Legitimacy Failures 
Lack of Legitimacy contributes to fragility when states have only limited 
support among the people they are supposed to govern and when 
political participation is suppressed, including the systematic exclusion of 
groups from political processes. Restrictions in civil liberties and control 
the media also contributes to legitimacy failure. When states are not 
subject to control or accountability mechanisms, either formally through 
political regulations or informally through legislation, their legitimacy is 
questionable (DFID UK, 2005, p. 8). Governments which are controlled 
by the military, either directly or through an autocratic interest in the 
political or economic arenas are also considered illegitimate (Stewart & 
Brown, Fragile States, 2010, p. 20). 
 
Having moved beyond the Millennium Development Goals deadline of 
2015 to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, a more universal 
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approach for assessing fragility will be needed that better articulates the 
diverse aspects of risk and vulnerability (OECD, 2015, p. 19). Failures in 
authority, service entitlements provision, and legitimacy have a 
detrimental impact upon states functioning for the benefit of the people 
living therein.  
 
2.3 Conflict as Stimulus for State Fragility, 
Underdevelopment, and Forced Displacement  
 
Conflict is a menace to human dignity. As represented in figure 2.1 
below, its effects that stimulate forced displacement are typically long-
term, inhibit national and regional development, and underlay state 
fragility in a mutually reinforcing cycle (Ikejiaku, 2009, p. 17). 
 
Figure 2.1: Conflict as a Driver for Mutually Reinforced 
Conditions of State Fragility, Forced Displacement and 
Underdevelopment (Source: Author) 
 
The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development in 2008 
was ratified by over 100 states. It declares that “living free from the threat 
of armed violence is a basic human need” (Geneva Declaration 
Secretariat, 2008, p. iii). Peace and human security is, therefore, a top 
CONFLICT 
State  
Fragility 
Under- 
development 
Forced 
Displacement 
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2030 Sustainable Development priority, highlighted by Goal 16 to 
“Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, 
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and 
inclusive institutions at all levels” (United Nations, 2016, p. 14). Reducing 
conflict and violence is essential for tackling state fragility, forced 
displacement and underdevelopment.  
 
Conflict can be seen as the struggle between individuals or groups over 
values or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims 
of the conflicting parties are to assert their values or claims over those of 
others (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999, p. 14). Conflict, particularly internal 
armed conflict, tends to occur in the world’s poorest countries (Nygård 
& Hegre , 2014, p. 3), the costs of which are both direct (loss of life, 
disability, and destruction) and indirect (prevention, instability, and 
displacement) (World Bank, 2011, p. 59). The effects of conflict 
emanating from poor countries also tend to spill over into neighbouring 
countries to the point where "states bordering countries at war are 
significantly more likely to experience conflict themselves" (Salehyan & 
Gleditsch, 2006, p. 1), creating what Wallenstein and Sollenberg (1998) 
coined ‘Regional Conflict Complexes’ (p. 622).  Increasing global 
interconnections also mean that conflict spill-over can reach beyond 
regional sites. This can occur through both refugee flows and economic 
damage brought about by curtailed investment and damage to markets 
and trade infrastructure (Baddeley, 2011). In 2014, such damage equated 
to 13.4% of world GDP (IEP, 2014, p. 3). 
 
Encouragingly, there is a gradual declining trend in overall conflict and 
violence worldwide, particularly internal armed conflict (Nygård & Hegre, 
2014, p. 1; HSRG, 2014). However, towards the end of the 20th century 
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(1989-2014), there was an overall upsurge of global organized violence 
(Melander, 2015, p. 9; Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015). The impact of 
conflict and violence upon poor countries also places them at risk of 
falling into entrenched cycles of conflict. Cycles of conflict can lead to 
civil violence, humanitarian crises such as rising poverty and mass forced 
displacement, and stalled or negative development, factors which 
perpetually reinforce one another (Gurr, Marshall, & Khosla, 2001, p. 
13). It can therefore be concluded that the more lasting the conflict and 
violence, the more lasting state fragility and underdevelopment will be. 
 
Figure 2.2 below illustrates the interconnected and mutually reinforcing 
relationship between conflict, state fragility, and underdevelopment 
where the 50 most deprived countries in each representative index are 
grouped according to where they occur simultaneously. Accounting for 
overlaps, a combined total of 79 countries are included across all three 
indexes. Twenty-two countries listed occur in all three indexes, directly 
linking conflict and violence or ‘low state of peace’, with ‘high state 
fragility’, and ‘low human development’; clearly illustrating the negative, 
mutually reinforcing relationship between conflict, state fragility, and 
development. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan are found in this group. 
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Timor-Leste was the only country to have only ‘high state fragility’, being 
absent from the two other lists. This demonstrates that Conflict and violence, 
and fragility are interlinked phenomena as all the other states with high fragility 
being found to have either a low state of peace, low level of human 
development, or both (see also OECD, 2012). Twenty-eight countries occurred 
in two lists, with 31 countries remaining in only one. Out of the 50 worst 
performing countries, 11 were common to both the Fragile States and Global 
Peace Indexes but absent from the Human Development Index, indicating a 
clear link between state fragility and violence, despite the relative absence of 
low human development. Syria illustrates this best, where the outbreak of civil 
conflict in 2011 was reflected in its increase in state fragility, going from 48th 
most fragile country in 2010 (The Fund for Peace, 2010, p. 1), falling to 9th 
most fragile in 2015 (The Fund for Peace, 2015, p. 19).  
 
Seventeen countries were common to both the fragile states and human 
development indexes but absent from the state of peace index, indicating a 
strong link between state fragility and low human development despite the 
relative absence of violence. Most of these countries are in Africa and are 
emerging from extended periods of serious conflict and civil war such as 
Liberia and Sierra Leone (UNDP, 2015, p. 4). Countries found in only one 
index and excluded from the two are still deprived qualifying as one the 50 
worst performing countries, perhaps having been excluded from another list by 
a small margin but should still be considered vulnerable. Of this group, 18 had 
a ‘low state of peace’ and 12 had ‘low human development’.  
 
Figure 2.2 above also illustrates that conflict is a vital root cause of 
underdevelopment due to insecurity and the immediate and lasting effects it 
has upon governance and stability. There are no countries out of the 50 most 
deprived simultaneously occurring solely in the Global Peace or Human 
Development Indexes. This can be explained by these countries being 
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invariably fragile as well, and therefore occurring in all three index lists. As 
highlighted in the closing Millennium Development Goals Report (2015), 
conflict-prone countries struggled most to fulfil their goals, concluding that 
conflict continues to loom as the largest threat to human development (United 
Nations, 2015, p. 8). 
 
2.4 Protracted Conflict as the Key Driver for Protracted 
Refugee Displacement 
 
Refugees and those in refugee-like situations are usually made so as a result of 
conflict which can be considered the most ubiquitous driving factor of forced 
migration. By the end of 2014, conflicts, violence and human rights violations 
had forced almost 60 million people to abandon their homes and seek 
protection elsewhere (United Nations, 2015, p. 23). The majority of the 
world’s refugees are in protracted situations (see chapter one), meaning that 
there are more than 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality who 
have been in exile for five years or more (UNHCR, 2015b, p. 11). The origin 
states of the eight largest refugee populations listed in table 2.1 below are 
embroiled in some sort of protracted conflict or generalised violence which 
has resulted in varying levels of concomitant protracted displacement (IEP, 
2014). With reference again to table 2.1, the extended conflicts, violence, 
deprivation and fragility  fuelling the situations faced by Iraqi, Afghan and 
Palestinian refugees, along with their respective hosts, are dire having passed 
thirty-years duration (Betts A., 2014, p. 4). 
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Table 2.1:  Origin and Number of Refugees Hosted by the Top Five 
Host Countries and the Duration of their Situations 
Host Country 
Origin  
Country(s)of 
Hosted Refugee 
Population 
Estimated 
Number of  
Hosted 
Refugees 
Refugee Crisis 
Duration [years] 
1 Turkey 
Syria 
1.59m 
5 
Iraq 30+ 
2 Pakistan Afghanistan 1.51m 30+ 
3 Lebanon 
Syria 
1.15m 
5 
Iraq 30+ 
Palestine 30+ 
4 Iran 
Syria 
982,000 
5 
Iraq 30+ 
Afghanistan 30+ 
5 Ethiopia 
Somalia 
659,000 
20 
Sudan 
20 
South Sudan 
Eritrea 20 
Source: Global Trends - Forced Displacement in 2014, UNHCR, 2015c 
 
 
The safety offered by refugee host states should be considered relative, and 
not guaranteed. For example, Ethiopia and Pakistan appear in all three indexes 
represented in figure 2.2 above and can barely be considered better 
environments for refugees than their origin states. In particular, they are 
considered the 119th and 154th (out of 162) least safe countries in the world 
(IEP, 2014, pp. 8-9).  Despite the risk of new potential insecurities, these ‘safe 
havens’ still represent improvements in security over refugees’ homelands. In 
contrast to this, refugee origin states (table 2.1); Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, 
and Pakistan are currently considered to be four of the most dangerous places 
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in the world with high levels of human insecurity (HSRG, 2014, p. 86). 
Contrary to representing a benign situation, the long-term presence of large 
refugee populations, as noted by Loescher and Milner (2011), has been a 
primary cause of conflict (p. 5). The presence of refugees is also considered a 
distinct marker of fragility (The Fund for Peace, 2015, p. 3), particularly those 
who qualify as ‘refugee warriors’, or combatants who cross borders to regroup, 
to perpetuate conflict (see Leenders, 2009, and Adelman, 1998).  
 
Protracted conflict and insecurity erodes stability and drives endemic state 
fragility, protracted refugee displacement, and chronic underdevelopment in a 
mutually reinforcing interrelationship. Due to the lasting effects that conflict 
has upon normative state function, “prolonged displacement often originates 
from the very states whose instability lies at the heart of chronic regional 
insecurity” (Loescher and Milner, 2009, p. 3; DFID, 2005, p. 5). This regional 
insecurity has multi-faceted and disastrous humanitarian consequences for 
already extremely vulnerable refugee populations. 
 
 
2.5 Protection and Solutions for Refugees in Protracted 
Situations  
 
The majority of the world’s refugees, approximately two-thirds, are in 
protracted situations.  The UNHCR defines a protracted situation as one in 
which “25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile 
for five years or more in a given asylum country” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 11). As 
Loescher, et al. (2008) note, each protracted refugee context is specific, multi-
dimensional and encompasses its own set of needs and, therefore, requires its 
own set of solutions (p. 10). On the ground, shortages and fluctuations in 
international donor funding places considerable extra strain on both 
vulnerable refugee and fragile host communities (Betts, A; et al, 2012, p. 42; 
UNHCR, 2015c, p. 1; UNHCR, 2015d) 
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Protracted situations create an impasse for many refugees due to inadequate 
and unsustainable circumstances such as high living costs and recent 
reductions to humanitarian aid, along with “a lack of employment 
opportunities, restrictive regulatory barriers, and inadequate access to services 
such as healthcare and education” (REACH, 2015, p. 7).  
Such an impasse is causing increasing numbers of refugees to transit beyond 
their regions of origin to the post-industrial north, mostly in pursuit of better 
livelihood and security options. These onward journeys are often undertaken 
at considerable exploitation-related risks such as human trafficking (UNHCR 
EXCOM, 2009). Theorist, Roger Zetter (2015) has termed this growing 
pattern of onward migration 'displacement continuum' which is characterised 
by, 
“a global reach, mixed drivers and flows, irregular or unauthorised 
movement not easily contained by border control or entry 
management, and migrants whose status is unclear and who fall outside 
international protection norms and frameworks" (p. 13). 
Those refugees unwilling or unable to risk onward journeys often remain in 
their protracted exile situations and become the immediate concern of the 
international refugee protection system, the goal of which is to safeguard the 
rights and welfare of refugees (UNHCR, 2011b, p. 3). 
 
The ultimate goal of the refugee protection system is to solve refugee crises in 
a sustainable and permanent way which will allow them to rebuild their lives in 
dignity and peace (UNHCR, 2003, p. 19). The UNHCR and its partners 
currently see three ‘durable solutions’ as the best chance for achieving this for 
refugees: voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and local integration (UNHCR, 
2015c, p. 13) The most preferable solution among refugees, and most 
commonly sought solution by agencies is voluntary repatriation where 
refugees return to their country of origin un-coerced (UNHCR, 2014b, p. 50). 
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However, even in post-conflict rebuilding phases, after long periods of 
absence from home returnees find that their rights to land, property and 
housing that belonged to them are now contested, or that assets have been 
usurped by others (Harild & Christensen, 2010, p. 4). Thus, for refugees’ 
homecoming to be viable, origin countries are required to stabilise and 
improve social and security conditions, and availability of services and 
livelihood opportunities considerably from when they drove refugees away in 
the first place. 
 
The most critical aspect to the success of any lasting refugee solution strategy 
is refugees’ access to sustainable livelihood opportunities (Harild & 
Christensen, 2010, p. 4; Long, 2009, p. 2). Livelihood opportunities are often 
scarce in refugee camps which forces refugees, particularly protracted refugees, 
to seek work in host-cities with already saturated labour markets, (Refugee 
Studies Centre, 2011, p. 16; UNHCR, 2008). The need to ensure livelihoods 
can be both positively and negatively affected by the embracing of ‘refugee’ as 
a category. As Van Hear (2003) points out, on one hand categorisation may 
give refugees access to resources and on the other, it may ‘root’, or contain 
people geographically and undermine means of livelihood that depend upon 
mobility (p. 14).  
 
In the context of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the three durable solution 
options can be considered one-dimensional because all three are “based on the 
idea that solutions are found when movements stop” (Monsutti, 2008, p. 59). 
Adhering to static solutions undermines the reality that mobility between 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and beyond, has historically been and remains, a 
livelihood strategy for refugees. By restricting refugee movements, an essential 
livelihood option is extinguished along with the sustainability and suitability of 
the solutions currently being pursued.   
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2.6 The Global Refugee Burden 
 
As the principal arbiter of global refugee protection, the UNHCR relies upon 
its ability to negotiate a framework of global solidarity and cooperation towards 
refugee protection and pursuit of durable solutions. Typically, this aimed to 
link financial incentives, resources, and development assistance available from 
Northern states as compensation for refugee protection, typically provided by 
Southern host state (Betts A, 2006, p. 12). Refugee protection activities 
undertaken by the UNHCR are dependent upon Northern donor-state 
contributions, which in many cases fall drastically short (UNHCR, 2015d). The 
UNHCR must therefore walk a political tightrope between its legal and human 
rights obligations, and the political concerns of donor, transit, and host states 
(Adelman, H, 2001, p. 10), all of which in a ‘post-September 11th world’, have 
national and regional security at the heart of their concerns.  
 
Refugees, particularly those in protracted situations emanating from states 
embroiled in conflict are considered a potential source of instability for host 
states. Possible affiliations to non-state actors, insurgents, or terrorist groups 
make them risky ‘guests’ for asylum states and with few economic and social 
opportunities for young refugees make them targets for recruiters (Loescher G. 
, Milner, Newman, & Troeller, 2008). However, despite UN Security Council 
and UN General Assembly concerns regarding refugees and asylum seekers 
being possible terrorists, as explained by Goodwin-Gill (2008), legitimate 
refugees have rarely, if ever, been guilty of terrorism or incitement (p. 2). 
 
In the context of Northern-centric policies, it is easy to see how refugee 
populations can become subject to political manipulation, in both the North 
and South. This has certainly been a characteristic during nearly four decades 
of the Afghan refugee crisis, which was both the longest running under 
UNHCR’s mandate, and largest in the world until it was overtaken by Syrian 
refugee crisis in 2015 (European Commission, 2016, p. 1). Afghan refugees in 
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Pakistan have been subject to considerable political manipulation, most 
notably, their militarisation against the Soviet Union by both hosts Pakistan 
and international Western governments (Grare, 2003, p. 88; Murshid, 2014, p. 
9). As outlined in chapter four of this report the series of conflicts that have 
plagued, and continue to plague Afghan peoples throughout their protracted 
exile have left the country in ruins and damaged any realistic hope of durable 
solutions to their displacement.  
 
2.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter has looked at state fragility as a key concept with regards to 
refugee protection due to, particularly conflict-affected fragile states, being 
both the origin and host sides of the international border. Therefore, state 
fragility is a key concern moving forward towards the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development agenda (ASD2030). This chapter noted that state 
fragility is a multidimensional concept, routed in historical economic and 
political transnational relations. The chapter also established the definitional 
framework through which state fragility will be conceptualised and analysed in 
this report as state failures of authority, legitimacy, and provision of service 
entitlements to citizens and residents.   
 
Conflict is the key stimulus that unites state fragility, underdevelopment and 
forced displacement in a mutually reinforcing cycle. This conclusion can be 
asserted following the examination of three commonly-referred to indexes; the 
Global Peace Index (2015), Fragile States Index (2015), and the Human 
Development Index (2015). This exercise showed that a mutually reinforcing 
cycle exists, particularly for those countries that have, or are undergoing 
protracted conflicts and generalised violence. Protracted conflict was also 
found to be concomitant with protracted forced displacement.  
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This chapter also concludes the most sought after solutions by refugees 
themselves, host states and international actors, that of refugee repatriation, 
was often the most difficult to attain for refugees in protracted situations. This 
is due to the sustained causes of refugee flight, for example, protracted 
conflict, insecurity, and lack of livelihood opportunities. Refugees that cannot 
find work opportunities often risk their lives migrating onward from 
neighbouring host countries, particularly to industrialised countries (Van Hear, 
2004, p. 3). Finally, burden sharing related to refugee protection represents an 
uneven relationship between the global North and South. Both host and 
donor countries have a propensity to politicise the plight of refugees, while not 
living up to donor pledges and placing increasing difficulty upon the refugee 
protection system and the refugees themselves.  
 
The next chapter contextualises Afghanistan as both a fragile state and the 
origin of one of the worst and most protracted refugee crises in the world. It 
focuses principally on the history of on-going conflict and insecurity as key 
driving factors which forced millions of Afghans from their homes, and 
through the inherent devastation, kept them away.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  
Afghan Refugees in Crisis: Conflict, Protracted State 
Fragility, and the Humanitarian Response 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Afghanistan and its Neighbours . (Source: Maphill, 2015) 
 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
Having explored the mutually reinforcing processes born out of conflict, we 
now examine Afghanistan, a classic long-running example of this. In order to 
contextualise the protracted Afghan refugee crisis in Pakistan, the aim of this 
chapter is to first offer a brief examination of Afghanistan as one of the most 
fragile states in the world. Second, to provide an analysis of the successive 
conflicts which forcibly displaced a large proportion of Afghanistan’s 
population and the reactive patterns of forced migration these triggered; and 
finally, to summarise the humanitarian response to the crisis by the 
international community and refugee hosts Iran and Pakistan.  
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As illustrated in figure 3.1 above, Afghanistan is a landlocked country   . It is 
bordered by seven countries with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to 
the North; Pakistan to the East and South; Iran to the West; and China’s 
Sinkiang Province in the Northeast. This remote and strategically significant 
region has historically proved irresistible to numerous aggressors and has long 
been fought over, despite the forbidding terrain of the Hindu Kush mountain 
range and the vigour and bravery of its people protecting it.   
 
Yet, no natural barrier could repress the battery of modern weaponry 
unleashed by the Soviet Union during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-89). This 
invasion moved Afghanistan to the forefront of late 20th century superpower 
conflict and “with inexorable swiftness, the old Afghanistan was shattered to 
the outrage of the entire civilised world” (Michaud & Michaud, 1980, p. 6). 
Following the eventual capitulation of the Soviet Union was the Afghan Civil 
War (1993-96), then a period of Taliban rule (1996-01), and finally occupation 
by American-led Coalition forces after the attacks on 11th of September 2001.  
 
Afghanistan’s people have borne the brunt of external invasions and 
numerous internal civil conflicts, the cumulative effects of which have 
outwardly characterised Afghanistan as a society in perpetual conflict and 
destitution. The successive conflicts mentioned above have forced the Afghan 
people into a protracted series of forced mass-migrations and returns. 
According to the latest UNHCR figures, Pakistan currently hosts 
approximately 2.6 million refugees mostly originating from Afghanistan’s cities 
and towns while Iran hosts nearly one million refugees (UNHCR, 2015g, p. 1). 
Nearly one million Afghans are internally displaced (UNHCR, 2015: p. 5). 
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3.2 Afghanistan: An Archetype of State Fragility 
 
Afghanistan has historically been, and continues to be considered one of the 
poorest, most underdeveloped and fragile states in the world. Due to 
Afghanistan’s unpredictable security situation, resource scarcity, and lack of 
government capacity and stability, it is an archetype of the correlation between 
conflict, fragility and underdevelopment mentioned in chapter two above 
(chapter two.2).  
 
Three key development indexes rank Afghanistan near the bottom globally. 
The 2015 Fragile States Index (2015) ranks Afghanistan as the 8th most fragile 
state in the world (tied with Syria). With a combined score of 107.9 (p. 7), 
Afghanistan ranks as one of 12 countries with a fragility status at the level of 
‘high alert’ (p. 7; see figure 1.2). To elaborate upon this Fragile States Index 
ranking further, with a score of 10 meaning extreme fragility, Afghanistan 
scored above 9 out of 10 in the categories of 'Demographic Pressures' (9.3), 
'Refugees/ IDPs' (9.1), 'State Legitimacy (9.7), 'Security Apparatus' (10), 
'Factionalised Elites' (9.3), and 'External Intervention' (9.8) (ibid, p. 6). 
Afghanistan also scored above 8.5 for 'Group Grievances' (8.9), ‘Economic 
Decline’ (8.6), and ‘Human Rights’ (8.6) (The Fund For Peace, 2015, p. 7). The 
2015 Global Peace Index ranks Afghanistan 160th out of 162 countries (IEP, 
2014, p. 9) despite its ‘external conflicts fought’ score improving due to the 
withdrawal of NATO forces at the end of 2014 (IEP, 2014, p. 10). As a ‘low 
income country under stress’ (LICUS), Afghanistan also appears on the World 
Bank’s Harmonised list of Fragile Situations (World Bank Group, 2015, p. 1). 
 
A wide array of issues contributes to Afghanistan’s on-going fragility. With 
limited freshwater resources, harsh winters and hot summers mean sparse 
rainfall and water scarcity, and with only 11.9% arable land (CIA, 2015, p. 1), 
Afghanistan has had to rely on high-margin cash crops such as opium, 
smuggling and collection of transit fees, and foreign aid for survival. 
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Continuous conflict has led to extreme and entrenched human insecurity and 
vulnerability resulting in seemingly insurmountable development challenges. 
These are reflected in the current Human Development Index which ranks 
Afghanistan at 169th out of 187 countries, with a status of ‘low human 
development’ (UNDP, 2015, p. 162).   
 
Continued conflict and insecurity carries with catastrophic domestic fallout 
and places tremendous pressure on any state to achieve development goals. 
For a state with few resources and entrenched fragility, it has been impossible 
for Afghanistan to initiate development programmes (United Nations, 2014, p. 
9). For example, because Afghanistan was recovering from decades of conflict, 
the Afghan Government endorsed the 2015 Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG) Declaration four years late, in March 2004, with a target for reaching 
its country-specific goals set at 2020 (Afghanistan NDS, 2010, p. 8). 
 
Examining Afghanistan briefly in the fragility framework of state legitimacy, 
authority, and capacity to deliver service entitlements outlined in chapter 2, 
Afghanistan fares dismally. Its lack of government legitimacy and 
accountability is a major cause of instability (Elhawary, Foresti, & Pantuliano , 
2010, p. 18). For example, the UN-led Bonn Agreement in 2001 was designed 
to install a functioning Afghan government but excluded key regional players 
and shied away from dealing with issues related to past abuses and human 
rights violations. Critics saw this agreement as “an illegitimate attempt to 
reconfigure domestic power structures to meet external interests” and 
legitimise the current Afghan government, whose illegitimacy remains a major 
obstacle to achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan (Goodhand & Sedra, 
Who Owns the Peace? Aid, Reconstruction and Peace-building in 
Afghanistan, 2009, p. 14).  
 
Afghan government authority suffers from the absence of effective 
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accountability, institutional infrastructure, and surrogate control by external 
international authorities through the influx of aid and military resources 
(Wilder & Gordon, 2009, p. 1). The lack of monopoly of the use of force due 
to the operations of numerous armed factions, including the overbearing 
presence of international military forces, has also undermined Afghan 
government authority. Government capacity is also highly eroded. A high 
incidence of corruption and insecurity stifles the mobilisation of resources. 
The 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2016) 
ranks Afghanistan the third most corrupt country out of 167, the prevalence 
of which feeds the cycle of on-going conflict (p. 11). The next chapter takes a 
detailed look at the historical narrative of conflict-induced forced displacement 
that has plagued the Afghan people for nearly four decades, including those 
who have returned home. 
 
3.3 Driven from Home: Protracted Conflict, Protracted 
Fragility, Displacement and Return 
 
3.3.1 The Tragic Carousel of Conflict in Afghanistan 
 
Chapter two above illustrated that conflict simultaneously drives forced 
migration, state fragility, and underdevelopment. This chapter aims to 
contextualise Afghanistan’s vulnerability through its recent history of conflict 
and fragility, and the patterns of forced migration they triggered. Four decades 
of fragility and insecurity in Afghanistan has created a perpetual refugee class 
the size of a small country. The refugee crisis defies easy solutions and 
continues unabated. As depicted in figure 3.2 below, at the time of writing the 
UNHCR considered approximately four million Afghans ‘persons of concern’, 
or 12% of Afghanistan’s overall population of nearly 30 million (Central 
Intelligence Agency (US), 2015). Over 2.6 million of these are refugees and 
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nearly one million are internally displaced (UNHCR, 2015j, p. 1).  
 
 
Figure 3.2: UNHCR Afghan 'Persons of Concern' in  Relation to 
Afghan Population – 2015 . Source: Adapted from UNHCR Population Statistics 
(UNHCR, 2015j) 
 
 
The current severity and entrenchment of Afghanistan’s overall fragility is 
unquestionably due to the upheaval caused by the series of four main conflicts 
spanning the last four decades, which have caused vast loss of life and 
displaced millions. These conflicts and their consequences will be briefly 
outlined below.  
From the time of Afghan independence in 1919, warm political relations with 
the Soviet Union led to financial investment in Afghanistan and would provide 
the basis of a communist coup in April 1978 (Grau & Cress, 2002, p. xxii). As 
a new Soviet patron-state, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan’s vision 
ran counter to the norms and customs deeply embedded in Afghan traditional 
social structures. Afghanistan’s long-held institution of resistance to non-
Afghan interference led tribal mujahedeen (warriors) to declare jihad (struggle) 
12% 
88% 
UNHCR Total Afghan
Population of Concern
Remaining Afghan
Population
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against the new communist-backed regime. The Soviet leadership decided that 
military intervention was the only way to rescue their client state from anarchy 
and on the 24th of December 1979, became yet another invader in 
Afghanistan’s story. The ensuing war pitted the mechanised military potency 
of superpower Russia against mostly Afghan mujahedeen guerrillas, and 
ensured that the war was long and destructive (Grau & Cress, 2002, p. 15).  
 
Eventually, unyielding guerrilla tactics from mujahedeen, who were armed and 
financed by the United States through Pakistan’s security services (ISI), and 
the tremendous cost of the war to Russia’s treasury, culminated in a Soviet 
withdrawal in February 1989. By the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet Union 
had dissolved, ending the Cold War with the United States. Afghanistan, one 
of the poorest countries in the world prior to the war, was in tatters. Estimates 
of between 850,000 and 1.5 million civilian casualties accompanied a refugee 
crisis unprecedented in human history (Sliwinski, 1980, p. 39; Khalidi, 1991).  
 
However, peace was short-lived. The power vacuum that followed the 
capitulation of Russia stimulated a civil war between Afghan mujahedeen 
(warrior) factions who were unable to agree on joint governance arrangements 
(BAAG, 2003, p. 7). By 1994, warlord-run tribal armies fought for control of 
the power centres and left 50,000 dead and the Northern capital, Kabul, in 
ruins. Kandahar in the South was divided and civilians "had little security from 
murder, rape, looting, or extortion" (Human Rights Watch, 2001, p. 15). It was 
this nest of warring tribal factions that provided the catalyst for the emergence 
of the Taliban.  
 
During the early 1980s and ‘90s, Pashtun religious leaders and ultra-
conservative groups from Saudi Arabia funded madrassas (schools) to provide 
selective religious education to Afghan refugee populations, mostly the sons 
and orphans of mujaheddin fighters. Alongside basic religious teachings, 
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students were taught that the divisiveness and lawlessness in Afghanistan 
could be fixed by the creation of a strict Islamic state. The ‘Taliban’ (students) 
had grown to more than 25,000 fighters and by mid-1995, and controlled most 
of Western and Southern Afghanistan.  
 
Initially, the Taliban brought relative peace and stability to the war-torn 
population and were welcomed (Rashid, Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam 
in Afghanistan and Beyond, 2010, p. 5). However, resentment was soon felt 
due to the Taliban’s anti-Western and anti-Shi’a positions, restrictions imposed 
based on rigid readings of Islam, and the strict application of Pashtun tribal 
social code, ‘Pushtunwali’3. As the Taliban moved to take over Northern 
Afghanistan in 1996, threatened former mujahedeen groups formed a 
‘Northern Alliance’ to oppose them and more fighting took place across the 
country.  
 
After al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the 11th September attacks in 2001, 
the United States and United Kingdom (with the help of Pakistan) launched 
‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan to dismantle Al-Qaeda’s 
Afghan operations and remove its sympathisers, the Taliban, from power 
(Bailey & Immerman, 2015, p. 57). Unseating the Taliban from power proved 
easier than eliminating them entirely. Despite tremendous firepower, a Taliban 
guerrilla insurgency against Coalition occupation continues to this day. 
Ceaseless war in Afghanistan over the last nearly four decades has meant 
between 106,000 and 170,000 civilian deaths have occurred between 2001 and 
the end of 2013 (PSR, 2015, p. 78). 
 
                                              
3 According to Ewans (2002), Pashtunwali is "a part feudal and part democratic ethos, an 
uncompromising Muslim faith and a simple code of conduct. Although the rigidity of this code, the 
Pushtoonwali has been diminishing over the years, it still establishes obligations of revenge (badal), 
hospitality (melmastia), and sanctuary (nanawati). Questions of honour (namus) and disputes of an 
economic or political nature have meant that private vendettas [which can last generations] and more 
generalised conflict have been endemic features of Pushtoon life" (p. 5). 
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3.3.2 Afghan Conflict-Forced Migration Patterns 
 
Each successive conflict period outlined above triggered the forced migration 
of Afghans that slowed or reversed with the relative stability of conflict 
cessation or subsidence. As figure 3.3 highlighted point ‘A’ illustrates below, at 
its worst in the aftermath of the war with the Soviet Union (1990), over 3.25 
million, mostly ethnic Pashtuns, had fled to neighbouring Pakistan, another 3 
million had fled to Iran (including Shi’a and some ethnic minorities), while 
many more Afghans were internally displaced (see figure 3.3 below; UNHCR, 
2015, p. 2).  At the end of the war, large-scale repatriation of refugees took 
place until the Afghan civil war and rise of the Taliban (figure 3.3, highlight 
point ‘B’) triggered a return exodus of Afghans to Pakistan and Iran, including 
ethnic minorities and remaining educated elites and professionals in fear of 
Pashtun-Taliban discrimination.  
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By the end of Taliban rule in 2001, the UNHCR recorded an estimated 1.2 
million people as internally displaced (UNHCR, 2002, p. 9). The relative 
stability accompanying the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan saw another 
wave of refugees return home. An increase in assaults between the occupying 
forces and the Taliban across Afghanistan during 2009-2010 stimulated a 
third exodus in as many decades. Figure 3.3 above at highlight point ‘C’ 
shows a total upsurge of 1.4 million Afghans who once again registered as 
refugees4. In addition to an increase in refugees, “by mid-2014, 683,000 
people were internally displaced by the conflict affecting 30 of the 34 Afghan 
provinces”, more than half of whom live in urban areas (see figure 3.3 below; 
UNHCR, 2015e, p. 1).  
 
Afghan refugee repatriation has clearly mirrored periodic and relative 
improvements in security and may be considered a rebound effect (see figure 
3.3 below). Borders are criss-crossed as dictated by conflict situations in 
Afghanistan intensifying or subsiding. An important nuance of this back-and-
forth Afghan migration in the case of Pakistan centres upon historical border 
porosity between the two countries.  Known as the Durand Line, the 
Afghan-Pak border was inherited from the time Afghanistan neighboured 
British India in 1893 as a way to definitively map Britain’s line of control 
(Razvi, 1979, p. 35; Qaseem, 2008, p. 93). Today, whilst internationally 
recognised as Pakistan’s ‘Federally Administered Tribal Areas’ (FATA), it is 
effectively controlled by ethnic Pashtun tribes and thus remains contested by 
Afghanistan (see chapter four). Many Pashtun Afghans consider this territory 
part to be part of Afghanistan in principle. The majority of Afghan refugees 
are located in this region to the east of the Durand Line in Pakistan’s FATA 
and Peshawar in the northwest, and Balochistan and Quetta in the southeast 
(see chapter four, figure 4.1).  
 
                                              
4 Refugee registration and documentation is now under the purview of Pakistan’s National Database 
& Registration Authority (NADRA) 
43
 
 
Fi
gu
re
 3
.4
: A
fg
ha
n 
R
ef
ug
ee
s 
an
d 
R
et
ur
ne
es
 fr
om
 P
ak
is
ta
n 
an
d 
Ir
an
, a
nd
 I
nt
er
na
lly
 D
is
pl
ac
ed
 P
er
so
ns
 -
 1
98
9–
20
14
.  
So
ur
ce
: U
N
H
CR
 P
op
ul
at
io
n 
St
at
ist
ic
s (
U
N
H
CR
, 2
01
5,
 p
. 1
)
0
50
0,
00
0
1,
00
0,
00
0
1,
50
0,
00
0
2,
00
0,
00
0
2,
50
0,
00
0
3,
00
0,
00
0
3,
50
0,
00
0
4,
00
0,
00
0
4,
50
0,
00
0
A
fg
ha
ns
 In
te
rn
all
y
D
isp
lac
ed
To
ta
l A
fg
ha
n
Re
tu
rn
ee
s
To
ta
l R
ef
ug
ee
s
(P
ak
ist
an
 +
 Ir
an
)
YE
AR
 
KE
Y 
Number of Persons 
44 
 
Repatriation has also been an on-going strategy by the UNHCR and host 
countries as an attempt to alleviate host burden and bring normality to the 
region. As can be seen in figure 3.3 above, repatriation figures rose sharply at 
the close of each conflict mentioned above during periods of relative 
security. For example, The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 triggered a mass-return 
movement, which meant that half of recorded refugees from the war had 
repatriated by 1994. Another mass-repatriation event occurred after the fall 
of the Taliban in 2001.  Other waves of refugees repatriating have 
accompanied the short post conflict periods, but handicapped by the fragility 
of Afghanistan itself (Long, 2013, p. 139; Kronenfeld, 2008, p. 43). 
 
3.4 Good Neighbours: The Global and Regional 
Response to the Afghan Refugee Crisis 
 
 
3.4.1 The International and Regional Response to Afghan 
Forced Migration 
 
Until the recent Syrian war reached its fourth year, generating nearly 4 
million refugees (UNHCR, 2014b, p. 1), the Afghan refugee situation was the 
largest that the UNHCR (and neighbouring governments Iran and Pakistan) 
has been called upon to deal with. Throughout the Afghan-Soviet war, 
Afghanistan’s neighbours, Pakistan and Iran, along with international 
humanitarian organisations, rallied to assist the Afghan civilian population. 
From the beginning of the refugee crisis, the response has been a multilateral 
one. 
 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) led the initial 
response until the Pakistan Government formally requested UN Refugee 
Commission (UNHCR) assistance in April, 1979. By October 1979, the 
UNHCR had an office in Islamabad and an assistance fund of 15 million US 
dollars (Cutts, 2000, p. 116). In close partnership with the Government of 
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Pakistan, they began the process of registering and providing for the 
thousands of people flooding out of Afghanistan (Schoch, 2008, p. 4). 
During the Afghan-Soviet war intervention period, international an 
international outcry to both cease and ease the violations related to the 
conflict (Human Rights Watch, 1991, p. 28). Joint action by United Nations 
agencies led by the UNHCR included the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), 
the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Food 
Programme (WFP).  
 
In addition to UN agencies, dozens of international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs) supplied refugees with emergency food, water, 
healthcare, sanitation, and education. By the time the Soviet army withdrew, 
there were over one hundred INGOs involved in Afghan refugee support 
operations in Pakistan (Cutts, 2000, p. 118).  As the various conflicts 
continued in Afghanistan, however, UN agencies and INGOs have 
periodically been compelled to withdraw staff from the country, slowing or 
halting the flow of aid and basic essentials (Lischer, 2005, p. 33; Linder, 
2010). 
 
Not all refugees were provided for equally. Conditions experienced and the 
international response varied widely between Afghan refugees who fled to 
Iran and those who settled in Pakistan (Cutts, 2000, p. 116). In Pakistan, the 
refugees shared a common Pashtun ethnicity with host populations, which 
eased social integration, and the UNHCR provided over 300 ‘Afghan 
Refugee Villages’ (Centlivres & Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p. 73), whereas 
refugees who fled to Iran were mixed and included ethnic Hazaras, Tajiks, 
and Uzbeks with far fewer Pashtuns. Comparatively, camps housed relatively 
few refugees in Iran where they were more likely to disperse into towns and 
cities throughout the country; integrating as well as they could into the local 
communities (Cutts, 2000, p. 117).  
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Once the emergency refugee situation stabilised by the early 1980s, the need 
for refugees to rebuild their livelihoods became apparent. The UNHCR 
began focusing on refugees' need for supplementary earnings, and “repair of 
the damage caused to infrastructure and natural resources by heavy 
concentrations of refugees in some areas” (World Bank Group, 2012, p. 1). 
The UNHCR partnered with World Bank to implement the ‘Income 
Generating Project for Refugee Areas (IGPRA-I) strategy financed from 
international grants totalling US $85.5 million and included input from host 
population and provided them with durable assets (World Bank Group, 
2012, p. 1).  
Not all refugees settled into camp life however. Many refugees took 
advantage of a porous border (see above), for social, political, and economic 
reasons. As Schmeidl and Maley (2013) note,  
"mobility has become not only a key livelihood and survival strategy 
for many Afghans, but  an integral part of their lives […] possibly two 
out of three Afghans have been displaced at least once" (p. 131). 
The reality for the majority of the refugees is that they have lived most, or all 
of their lives as exiles and many have never been, or have any incentive to 
return to Afghanistan (Saito & Hunte, 2007, p. 24). Returnees go back to a 
country that remains plagued by war, poverty, and lawlessness, are faced with 
worse living conditions. Upon return, refugees often have to make do with 
makeshift camps and squatter settlements, and the high probability of 
internal displacement due to “insurgency violence, landlessness or natural 
disasters” (Schmeidl & Maley, 2013, p. 131). According to a report by the 
Feinstein International Centre (FIC) in 2012, for example, 15%  of the 
population are without access to even basic healthcare services and one in 
three Afghan children are malnourished, with rates far higher in conflict-
affected regions (Benelli, Donini, & Niland, 2012, p. 6).  Returning home 
under difficult conditions doesn’t always provide a permanent, sustainable 
solution to refugees’ plight, and many return to Pakistan or Iran.  
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3.4.2 Competing Global Crises, Funding Fluctuations, and 
Fragile Solutions 
 
By the mid-1990s, with the Afghan refugee situation well into its second 
decade and the advent of a number of new crises in Bosnia and Rwanda, 
interest in Afghan refugees had waned and ‘donor fatigue’ had set in. A 1995 
joint World Food Programme and UNHCR report argued that “many 
refugees have reached a level of self-sufficiency” and that their “nutritional 
status is satisfactory” (WFP/UNHCR, 1994, p. 29). The UNHCR announced 
that it would phase out Afghan refugee assistance by 1998, despite the on-
going war between the Taliban and Northern Alliance.  
 
For Pakistan, over two decades hosting refugees coincided with diminished 
donor funding, further refugee influxes, and a faltering economy and its 
initially generous welcome had worn thin in Islamabad (Safri, 2011, p. 599). 
Anti-refugee sentiment had also set in among local politicians, civilians, and 
the media, which led to increased harassment by non-Afghan locals and 
deportations of Afghans in Pakistan (Amnesty International, 2001, p. 1). 
Increasingly harsh camp conditions and particularly the discontinuation in 
food assistance meant, “more than 70% of registered Afghan refugees lived 
outside” of camps (Khan, 2014, p. 22). In late 2000, Pakistan officially closed 
its borders to new Afghan refugee arrivals and forced some to repatriate, at 
odds with the international legal principle of non-refoulement. (US 
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2001, p. 5). 
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Figure 3.5 above illustrates the low levels of international funding 
dedicated to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Resources with which the 
UNHCR had to operate in the late 1990s were low. This changed 
after the 11th September 2001 attacks where the focus returned to 
Afghanistan as the probable location of the attackers. In 2002, with 
the interjection of the United States and its Coalition partners against 
the Taliban, the plight of the Afghan refugees was again on the 
international humanitarian radar and financial aid followed.  
 
3.4.3 The Status Quo of Afghan Forced Displacement 
and the Refugee Repatriation Solution 
 
In 2008, the UNHCR conceded, “the Afghanistan experience has 
highlighted the complexity of the repatriation and reintegration 
process, which has proven to be a much more sustained and complex 
challenge than initially anticipated” (UNHCR, 2008, p. 9). Well in to 
its fourth decade, the Afghan refugee crisis had proven intractable. In 
the search for enduring solutions to declining returnee numbers and 
persistent problems in the reintegration of returnees (Bialczyk , 2008, 
p. 14), a quadripartite consultative process was initiated in 2011 
involving the UNHCR and the Islamic Republics of Afghanistan, Iran 
and Pakistan. As a result, the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees 
(SSAR), a regional multi-year initiative, was formulated (see chapter 
five). The SSAR aimed to help facilitate voluntary return and 
sustainable reintegration and provide assistance to host countries 
(UNHCR, 2012, pp. 12-13). 
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Afghanistan’s fragility has severely hampered the implementation of 
SSAR resettlement programmes. Despite the return of 5.8 million 
Afghan refugees since 2002, and the current returnee population of 
Afghanistan being 20% (UNHCR, 2015, p. 4), corruption and Lack of 
Afghan Ministerial Capacity have prevented its implementation 
(SIGAR, 2015, p. 22). In reality, when Afghan refugees do repatriate, 
they return to a country that remains plagued by war, poverty, and 
lawlessness, are faced with worse living conditions such as makeshift 
camps and squatter settlements, and the high probability of internal 
displacement due to “insurgency violence, landlessness or natural 
disasters” (Schmeidl & Maley, 2013, p. 131).  
 
3.5 Chapter Conclusion 
 
Afghanistan is an archetype of state fragility. A combination of 
continuous conflict and insecurity, considerable long-term poverty, 
ineffective governance, and on-going outside interference has shaped 
Afghanistan into one of the most fragile states in the world. The 
concomitant protracted refugee crisis was primarily triggered, and is 
sustained by a series of four main conflicts beginning with the most 
destructive, decade-long Soviet-Afghan War (1979-89). Over time, 
these conflicts have caused enormous loss of life; destroyed 
infrastructure, destabilised the country, and entrenched Afghanistan’s 
fragility. The legacy of insecurity and lawlessness has also provided 
nurturing context for factionalised non-state armed groups allowing 
some, such as the Taliban, to rise to considerable power. Such groups 
continue to war amongst themselves and nurture Afghanistan’s 
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instability.  
 
Each successive conflict outlined in the chapter above has been 
punctuated by distinct waves of forced migration, mirrored by 
‘rebound’ waves of voluntary repatriation aided by a porous Pakistani 
border (figures 3.3 and 3.4 above). However, the volatile security 
situation means that conditions are rarely conducive to large-scale 
humanitarian action. Operations on the ground oscillate between 
unpredictability and life threatening, with aid flows to refugees 
regularly being slowed or stopped. Inconsistent International and 
regional efforts and relief funding has ensured that that the Afghan 
refugee crisis is now all but terminal.  
 
Now well into its fourth decade, the Afghan refugee crisis is the 
second largest and most protracted under UNHCR’s mandate and 
solutions will remain elusive without stabilising Afghanistan. In light 
of Afghanistan’s high levels of insecurity and fragility, the key 
UNHCR solution of voluntary repatriation has become very difficult 
to implement. Overall, the plight of refugees has not improved, and 
with Pakistan’s ‘welcome mat’ wearing thin Afghan refugees are now 
facing increasing pressure to ‘voluntarily’ return to an insecure and 
broken homeland. 
 
The following chapter rounds off the contextual background of the 
Afghan refugee crisis by examining the fragility facing principal long-
term host to Afghan refugees, Pakistan. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
Framing a Fragile State: The Case of Pakistan  
 
Figure 4.1: The Location of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan. 
(Source: UNHCR, 2015, p. 1) 
 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
Having established in the previous chapter that Afghanistan is one of 
most conflict-affected fragile states in recent history, this chapter 
looks at Pakistan as both a fragile state and principal host to Afghan 
refugees. Pakistan was founded as a homeland for Muslims in 1947 
during the Partition of India. Today, it is geographically situated in 
one of the most volatile regions in contemporary world geopolitics.  It 
is also one of the world’s most fragile states and host to approximately 
1.6 million Afghan refugees, the highest number by a single country in 
the world (UNHCR, 2015h, p. 4). Located in the Indus Valley, the 
region that is now Pakistan lies at an intersection of religious and 
political ideologies (see figure 4.1 above). It has presided over 
historical processes of civilizational cross-fertilization, and helped 
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shape international events from as early as the third millennium BC 
(McIntosh, 2002, p. 142).  
 
This chapter aims to contextualise Pakistan as both a fragile state and 
‘fragile host’ to Afghan refugees. It will begin with an examination of 
Pakistan’s inception as a nation, the political climate from which the 
idea of a Pakistan grew; then by the event known as Partition and the 
political instability which followed characterised by the on-going 
oscillation between civilian and military rule. Using the framework 
outlined in the Literature Review above, it will then examine Pakistan 
as a fragile state in the 21st century, explored in terms of state 
‘legitimacy’, ‘authority’, and ‘service entitlements’ failures (see Chapter 
two; 2.1). 
 
4.2 A Fragile Birth: The Political Realisation of 
Pakistan, Partition and Violent Beginnings 
 
4.2.1 The Road to Partition 
 
Pakistan’s status as one of the world’s most fragile states can be traced 
back to the mass exodus of refugees from India, mass social and 
territorial violence, and inequitable resource allocation that 
trammelled its inception as a nation. These historical (traumas) have 
plagued Pakistan’s state-building activities, and ensured that the 
challenge of recovering from state fragility is immense. The story of 
Pakistan begins with political insecurity.  
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During the first half of the 20th century, the promotion of democratic 
institutions the British Raj was received by Muslim leaders as a way of 
relegating Indian Muslims to minority status in greater India (Cohen, 
2004, p. 24; Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, cited in Symonds, 1950, pp. 30-
31). The implications of this disadvantage united the ethnically diverse 
and disparate Indian Muslim population towards national self-
determination (Ziring, 1977, p. 385).  
 
After fierce campaigning the Indian Independence Act (1947) ratified 
a partition plan which re-configured the Indian Subcontinent into two 
sovereign territories (U.K. Parliament, 1947). The Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan was founded on the 14th of August 1947, followed by the 
Republic of India the following day (Indian Independence Act 1947, 
c. 30). Pakistan was divided further in to West (Punjab, Balochistan 
and Sindh) and East (Bengal) with over 1600 kilometres of Indian 
Territory in between (Kulke & Rothermund, 1998, p. 292). The 
practical application of Partition was immediately problematic. 
 
It was expected that the strategically important province of Kashmir 
would accede with Pakistan due to a Muslim majority (Kalis & Dar, 
2013, p. 122). Fatalistically however, its Hindu ruler, Hari Singh, 
wanted independence from either side. Fighting commenced 
immediately and a Muslim insurgency pushed towards the State’s 
capital. Singh’s response was to appeal to India in exchange for 
military assistance. India agreed to help under the condition that 
Kashmir would become Indian Territory and would march troops and 
machinery towards Srinagar to counter the insurgency. Singh signed 
an ‘Instrument of Accession’, the document by which princely states 
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contracted themselves to either India or Pakistan on the 27th of 
October, 1947 in contravention of a prior ‘Standstill Agreement’ with 
Pakistan (Indurthy & Haque, 2010, p. 10). (Kaplan, 2008, p. 151) 
Altogether Pakistan was apportioned 19% of the population and 23% 
of the territory of colonial India (Ahmed, 1996: p. 170). The areas that 
made up Pakistan, with the exception of West Punjab were mostly 
tribal territories or undeveloped hinterlands ruled over by regional 
“patrimonial landlords, headmen, tribal chiefs, and religious teachers 
(ulema)” (Ziring, 1977, p. 392). Pakistan’s population had little 
political consciousness of a modern state. However, strong 
bureaucratic, legal, and military traditions, a geographically strategic 
position, and the uniting figure of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, were 
foundations which a new state could be built upon. 
 
4.2.2 The Legacy of Partition: Violence and the Unjust 
Apportionment of India’s Resources 
 
The ‘Radcliffe Line’ which splits the Punjab and carves West Pakistan 
from India was the site of one of the largest mass cross-migrations of 
the 20th Century (Bharadwaj, Khwaja, and Mian, 2008). As Cohen 
(2004) notes, “of all the schemes that had been discussed over the 
years, the plan to create a single Muslim state with two wings […] was 
perhaps the most problematic to implement and certainly 
unprecedented” (p. 39). Having brought the timeline for 
Independence forward by at least six months, British negotiators had 
ensured that the process would be predictably chaotic. At the time, 
Muslims comprised 53% of the Punjab’s population along with 31% 
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Hindus and 15% Sikhs (Census of India, 1941 cited in Baixas, 2008, 
3). Heightened sectarian awareness instilled by pre-independence 
political campaigning combined with a truncated Partition timeline 
contributed to the outbreak of mass violence that followed.  
 
The resulting number of Partition casualties continues to fuel debate 
and estimates range from approximately 200,000 (Moon, 1998, p. 23) 
to 1.5 million (Baixas, 2008, p. 32). Sources that are most likely closer 
to the truth offer a range between 200,000 and 360,000 casualties 
(Brass, 2003, p. 75). Accompanying the Partition massacres was the 
pervasive victimisation of women, a side to the historiography of 
Partition which has only begun to be explored and understood 
(Virdee, 2013; and Ali, 2009). Approximately 75,000 women are 
thought to have been either raped or abducted across the new border 
on both sides (Pandey, 2001, p. 2; Menon & Bhasin, 1993). 
 
Along with numerous territorial disputes, ensuing mass violence 
meant that the first crisis facing Pakistan was a refugee one5. At least 
13 million people were made refugees in the crossover migration, 10 
million from Punjab, comprising 4.5 million non-Muslims and 5.5 
million Muslims (Hansen, 2002, p. 1). Pakistan’s need to resettle 
millions of new Pakistanis along with other planned nation building 
activities were severely hampered by India’s failure to adhere to 
Partition terms. India’s early lack of cooperation has been continually 
alluded to during Pakistan’s political history (Cohen S. P., 2004: p. 47).  
 
                                              
5 It should be noted that the idea that state formation (such as the Partition of the 
Subcontinent) creates refugees is contested. See, Rahman & van Schendel, 2003. 
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As the backdrop of their shared history, the scars of Partition 
continue to negatively affect relations between India, Pakistan, and 
the stability of the region as a whole today. Both historical and 
contemporary challenges facing Pakistan in particular have ensured 
that it remains one of the world’s most fragile states.  
  
4.3 The Fragile State of 21st Century Pakistan  
 
Pakistan is one of the world’s most fragile states. The 2015 Fragile 
States Index published by The Fund for Peace (2015) ranks Pakistan 
as the 13th most fragile state in the world with a ‘High Alert’ score of 
102.9, combining 12 aspects (see Chapter one, Figure 1.2). To 
elaborate on this state fragility score further, with high scores out of 
10 representing extreme fragility, Pakistan scored over 8.5 out of ten 
in 8 out of 12 categories. These categories represent numerous 
problems facing Pakistan such as 'Demographic Pressures', or effects 
of population growth on the environment (9). Political tension 
between groups and the government is represented by 'Group 
Grievances' (10) is linked to tensions created by lack of 'State 
Legitimacy’ (8.6), 'Factionalised Elites' (9.2), and inconsistencies in 
upholding ‘Human Rights and Rule of Law’ (8.4). Pakistan’s lack of 
security was represented by the categories of 'Security Apparatus' (9.6) 
and the presence of 'External Intervention' (9.3) (The Fund for Peace, 
2015, p. 6). Pakistan’s recognised protracted refugee burden also 
contributes to its overall fragility with a 'Refugees and Internally 
Displaced People' score of 8.9. Pakistan’s role as host to Afghan 
refugees also carries with it a range of long-term social, political, 
economic, environmental, and security impacts (Puerto Gomez & 
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Christensen, 2010, p. 19; MacLeod, 2008, p. 335; Rashid, 2008). 
 
Pakistan faces considerable development challenges, with a little over 
one third of its population settled in urban areas; while two-thirds live 
in poorer rural or semi-rural conditions (Cohen, 2014, p. 364; OECD, 
2015a, p. 15). As with most fragile states, development has been 
difficult for Pakistan and the state has struggled to deliver on its 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) commitments. Pakistan 
adopted 16 targets and 41 indicators against which progress towards 
achieving the Eight Goals of the MDG’s was measured. Data 
available for 33 of these indicators reveal that Pakistan was on track to 
achieve the targets on 9 indicators, whereas its progress on 24 
indicators is off track and unlikely to be achieved (UNDP, 2013b). 
Pakistan also ranks low in the Human Development Index in the 
world, ranking 146th out of 187 countries (UNDP, 2015, p. 170), and 
with only 2.4% of GDP spent on education, it has a low literacy rate 
of 53% (UNDP, 2015, p. 194). 
 
There are myriad and complex difficulties for Pakistan to overcome in 
almost every area of responsibility to its citizens. Pakistan’s 
combination of violent sectarian divides, “weak governing institutions, 
and abysmal education, health, and employment conditions make it a 
textbook example of a fragile state” (Kaplan, 2008, p. 146).  
As explained in chapter two (chapter two.5), these challenges can be 
framed by the relative strengths and vulnerabilities in one or more of 
three components of ‘statehood’: service entitlements provision, 
legitimacy and authority. The following chapter will review Pakistan’s 
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fragility with regards to each of these. First it will examine Pakistan’s 
incapacity to provide basic quality services for all citizens, inclusively 
manage public affairs towards poverty reduction, and reduce exposure 
to the impacts of natural disasters; secondly it will look at Pakistan’s 
governance legitimacy failures with regards to restrictions on political 
participation, civil liberties and media, lack of control mechanisms and 
accountability, and challenges to enact binding legislation; and finally, 
this chapter will survey state authority failures related to Pakistan’s 
inability to establish justice through rule of law, protect all citizens, 
and exercise territorial control.  
 
4.3.1 Fragility Based on Services Entitlements Failures 
 
A key aspect of robust governance is a state’s ability to include all 
people within its geographical bounds in programs of development 
and services provision (Naude, et al, 2011, p. 48). Because Pakistan 
was founded as a homeland for India’s Muslims, religion plays a 
significant role in Pakistani society. The breakdown in Figure 4.1 
illustrates the dominance of Pakistan’s Sunni Muslim community 
(84%), followed by a large Shia minority (12%), and the least 
considered minority of Christians, Hindus and people of other faiths. 
Although recent consecutive Pakistani governments have made some 
progress integrating the majority of its religious and ethnic groups, 
institutional over-centralisation has ultimately enhanced sectarian 
disputes, often to the detriment to minority groups.  
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Figure 4.2: Religious Groups in Pakistan  (Source: US Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2015) 
 
In addition to these ethnic and religious divisions, resistance to the 
introduction of Western cultural influences has deepened existing 
fissures within some traditional religious groups. For some sections of 
Pakistan’s majority Sunni population, religious fundamentalism has 
spread as a reaction to these cultural changes which is serving to 
weaken Pakistani civil society and the military (Cohen, 2014, p. 90). 
Despite state patronage of religious affairs leaning strongly towards 
Sunni groups, Pakistan’s government has slowly drawn politically and 
economically closer to its Shia-majority neighbour Iran, which 
provides a diplomatic shield for Pakistan’s Shia minority (Kaplan, 
2008, p. 153). Pakistan’s warming of relations with Iran has been met 
with indignation by hard-line Sunnis and has further divided 
communities. 
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Besides religious differences, the extraordinary diversity of ethnic 
groups, cultures, traditions, and languages within Pakistan offers 
significant political opportunity for division. Pakistan comprises five 
main ethno-linguistic groups, as figure 4.2 (below) explains with 
Punjabi, Pashtun, Sindhi, Mohajir, and Baluchi, and a number of 
smaller groups, all competing for shares and influence over state 
resources. 
  
 
Figure 4.3: Ethno-Linguistic Groups in Pakistan.  (Source: US 
Central Intelligence Agency, 2015, p. 1)  
 
Punjabis represent the majority in Pakistan and limits to non-Punjabi 
political influence and access to resources has helped impress upon 
the public that successive regimes are solely concerned with Punjabi 
interests. This has, at one time or another provoked every other major 
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group against the state. In practical terms, little centralised Pakistani 
authority can be seen, something which Kaplan (2008) traces to the 
military’s stranglehold over resources and “the elite’s obvious lack of 
interest in fostering social development among the general 
population” (p. 155). High levels of institutional incapacity and 
corruption have not only effected the general distribution of the 
country’s wealth to the social margins, but has also been damaging to 
Pakistan’s economy.  
 
Pakistan’s economy is particularly vulnerable to domestic shocks 
emanating from a number of sources, including political protests and 
raised significant political uncertainty, natural disasters that affect 
crops, and terrorism. The recent favourable slump in international oil 
prices and steady implementation of structural reforms by the 
government has meant some economic improvement, particularly in 
the agriculture and services sectors (World Bank, 2015). In addition to 
these, years of inefficient borrowing has seen Pakistan’s public and 
external debt reach crisis levels, which increased the tax burden and 
net outflow of resources (World Bank, 2015b, p. 112).  
 
Fragile states also usually struggle to efficiently manage public 
resources towards poverty reduction and prosperity (see chapter two, 
section 2.2 above). Internationally, Pakistan has the enviable, if not 
anxious partnership leverage as an ‘energy corridor’ to the warm water 
ports of the Arabian Sea and international markets for the oil and gas-
producing Central Asian states and Russia (Sahira & Qureshi, 2007, p. 
2033). However, its mismanagement of public resources means that 
Pakistan faces its own significant energy security crisis with domestic 
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oil and gas supplies forecast to run dry by 2025 and 2030 respectively 
(Mills, 2012, p. 5). According to Abbasi, et al, (2014) Pakistan’s 
“expensive fuel mix, poor governance, unprofessional management 
and irrational subsidies with surging circular debt are dragging the 
power sector towards total collapse" (p. 4). As a matter of both 
regional and domestic security Pakistan must not only urgently 
formulate a coherent energy strategy, but also capitalise on energy 
trade with its neighbours. This will likely include complex negotiations 
with India (Mills, 2012, p. 14), Russia (See; Overland, 2009), China 
(Aneja, 2006, p. 2)6, and possibly Qatar (Hussain, 2013, p. 141). 
Pakistan’s unstable energy situation is a major cause of its fragility and 
the high security risks associated with its current solution. 
Transnational energy dependence may alleviate some of Pakistan’s 
fragility in the short term, but will potentially lay the foundations for 
future conflict (Dannreuther, 2010, p. 4).  
 
Pakistan’s access to water was restricted by India gaining control over 
the headwaters of the Indus River at the time of Partition (Siddiqui, 
2010). This created a situation of Indian ‘hydro-hegemony’ and gave 
India the leverage to turn fertile Pakistan into a desert (Zeitouna & 
Warner, 2006, p. 439; Ali, 2008, p. 169). Limited control of hydro-
sources, along with poor infrastructure has led to inconsistent 
availability of electricity in many of Pakistan’s centres. Unresolved 
water disputes between Pakistan and India also adds another 
dimension to the Kashmir conflict due to part of the watershed, the 
Chenab River, being located in Indian-occupied Kashmir (Baqai, 
                                              
6 China is the currently the only nuclear power plant supplier to Pakistan and is facing 
considerable international criticism over its bilateral trade agreement (Aneja, 2006). 
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2005, p. 84; and Price, 2014, p. 3).  
 
The abovementioned challenges to resource management and 
inadequate infrastructure, significantly increases the impact of natural 
disasters upon Pakistan’s population, particularly the poor. Located in 
a geologically and climatologically active area, with frequent 
earthquakes and flooding, Pakistan is highly susceptible to natural 
disasters. It is also one of the most vulnerable countries in the world 
to climate change, and ranked 10th on the 2015 Global Climate Risk 
Index (Kreft, et al, 2015, p. 6; and Khan & Khan, 2008, p. 2). Pakistan 
suffered its most serious natural disaster events at the start of the 21st 
century: the 2005 Kashmir earthquake; and the worst monsoon floods 
in 80 years along the Indus river basin in 2010. In state fragility terms, 
Pakistan’s capacity to respond to natural and civil disasters has been 
limited by unreliable emergency preparedness infrastructure, and 
disaster response planning and management systems. Despite the 
formation of the National Disaster Management Commission 
(NDMC), and Authority (NDMA) in 2007, Pakistan continues to rely 
heavily on international assistance and emergency relief donations.  
 
4.3.2 Fragility Based upon Government Legitimacy 
Failures 
 
Governing regimes need to be able to command at least some public 
support for state policy in order to be considered durable (Naude, et 
al, 2008, p. 148). At the time of Partition, a ‘triumvirate’ of elites 
consisting of the army, the bureaucracy, and the feudal landlords came 
to dominate the politics and society of Pakistan, and today “continue 
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to exercise inordinate influence over public and economic affairs” 
(Cohen, 2004, p. 45). Although Pakistan maintains a parliamentary 
democracy (Government of Pakistan, 2015, p. 1), successive coups by 
the military have repeatedly nullified democratic rule. This, along with 
corrupt election practices, has led to instability, public mistrust, and 
the erosion of government legitimacy. During democratic periods 
“representation of ethnic interests at the provincial level and greater 
negotiation between the centre and the provinces” reduced both 
resentment toward the state and sectarian conflict (Kaplan, 2008, p. 
154).  
 
As Giunchi (2014) notes, neither elected nor unelected governments 
have been attentive to the public health and education sectors, 
especially in the poor rural areas, but rather, spent considerable 
amounts of money on defence (p. 6). Military and civilian elites 
consolidate their power with repeated manipulation of legislation, 
laws, legal infrastructure, and judges which has weakened institutions 
and contributed to widespread lawlessness within Pakistani society 
(Kaplan, 2008, p. 156). Along with its periodic government of 
Pakistan, the military plays a considerable role in Pakistan’s economy 
and has invested in a diverse range of economic sectors including 
finance, construction, and agriculture. Investments such as these make 
the Pakistani military the largest commercial investor in the country 
(Siddiqa, 2007, p. 18). Given that the military has such a large 
operational and financial stake in how the government operates, any 
withdrawal from Pakistan’s political scene is highly unlikely. The 
establishment of a military-governed National Security Council in 
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2004 has only further institutionalised the military’s domination over 
future governments (Kaplan, 2008, p. 152).  
Civic outrage and public dialogue over these manoeuvres has been 
muted because of the Pakistani media’s lack of institutionalised 
autonomy. The government uses a range of legal and constitutional 
powers to curb press freedom and its law against blasphemy has been 
used to silence journalists. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s print media is 
among the most outspoken in South Asia and internet use among the 
general population is rapidly increasing (Mezzera & Sial, 2010, p. 10). 
 
The ability to generate public support for legislation and 
implementation of policies is a key function of a stable state (Naude, 
et al, 2008, p. 148). Public trust in policy processes has eroded in 
Pakistan on account of successive governments, particularly the 
military, manoeuvring to consolidate their power. As an example, the 
installation of serving and retired military personnel in public 
positions has ensured the military’s agenda (Kaplan, 2008, p. 152). 
Problems implementing even positive legislative changes have meant 
that benefits are rarely seen by Pakistan’s citizens, particularly those 
most in need, and institutional decision making processes are regularly 
circumvented. Public awareness of such action has led to a widespread 
loss of faith in legislative processes (PILDAT, 2015, pp. 21-22). 
Widespread corruption and financial mismanagement has also eroded 
institutional integrity and public trust in electoral and government 
systems, along with Pakistan’s ability to mobilise public resources. 
System deficiencies related to corruption represent one of Pakistan’s 
main roadblocks to development. The Corruption Perception Index 
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in 2014 released by Transparency International ranks Pakistan as 
having the 50th most corrupt Public Sector out of 167 countries 
(Transparency International, 2016, p. 7). Ranked among the top 33% 
of corrupt countries globally indicates the likelihood of widespread 
bribery, lack of accountability, and public institutions that don’t 
respond to citizens’ needs in Pakistan. An example of this at the 
highest level was Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf’s arrest over 
corruption allegations (Rodriguez, 2013, p. 1).  
 
 
4.3.3. Fragility based upon State Authority Failures 
 
Establishing fair and equitable systems of justice, law and legislation is 
another key marker of stable statehood (Naude, et al, 2011, p. 149). 
Progress on these systems has also been marred as military and 
civilian elites repeatedly manipulate laws, courts, and judges in order 
to consolidate their power. An example of this is the government’s 
inability to formulate a cogent national policy towards its Afghan 
refugee population, despite nearly four decades as host. Only in July 
2013, did the Government of Pakistan approve a new policy on 
Afghan refugees, having previously relied upon the generic 
‘Foreigners order’ from 1951, which treated undocumented refugees 
as illegal aliens (Issa, Desmond, & Ross-Sherif, 2010, pp. 171-172) 
(Government of Pakistan, 2015). This policy includes the extension of 
the Proof of Registration (PoR) cards and the Tripartite Agreement 
on Voluntary Repatriation until 31 December 2015 (UNHCR 
Pakistan, 2014, p. 1). A draft national policy beyond 2015 is currently 
being deliberated (UNHCR, 2015, p. 13). Until this is agreed, the 
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Government of Pakistan has extended Afghan refugee PoR cards 
until 2017 the 4th extension it has provided as hosts (Human Rights 
Watch, 2016, p. 1). 
 
The intermittent influence of the military has weakened institutions 
and contributed to the widespread lawlessness within Pakistan’s 
society (Kaplan, 2008, p. 156). The Pakistani Military also plays a 
considerable role in Pakistan’s economy and has taken control of both 
private sector and public sector initiatives such as banks, construction, 
and agriculture, making the military the largest commercial player in 
the country (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 18). Given that the military has such a 
large operational and financial stake in how the government operates, 
any withdrawal from the political scene is highly unlikely. The 
establishment of a military governed National Security Council in 
2004 has effectively institutionalised the military’s dominance over 
future governments (Kaplan, 2008, p. 152).  
 
It has also been difficult for Pakistan’s central authorities to impose its 
agency over parts of its territory. The people residing in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the Northwest of Pakistan give 
pre-eminence to self-governing tribal councils (Jirga) which operate 
semi-autonomously, albeit technically in parallel to Pakistani law 
(Kaplan, 2008, p. 155). These mostly tribal areas have been seen as 
pseudo-colonies by successive Pakistani governments since 
independence and their inhabitants as partial citizens. Thus, they have 
been persistently underserved by the government. Similar situations to 
this can be found in other peripheral areas of Pakistan such as the 
Northern Areas and Baluchistan in the Southwest (see chapter five). 
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Security issues emanating from the FATA are also an authority 
concern for Pakistan and can be directly linked to an earlier territorial 
dispute with Afghanistan from the time of Partition over the validity 
of the Durand Line as a border. The lack of effectual information, and 
confusion over documents historically agreed upon by British India 
and Afghanistan in 1893 proliferate contentions over the Durand Line 
(Qaseem, 2008, p. 1). International law however, supports the original 
agreement that the Durand Line is enforceable as a border in the 
post-British period (Razvi, 1979, p. 39).  
 
Another marker of state validity is the ability to provide citizens with a 
safe, secure, and stable environment (Naude, et al, 2011, p. 48). 
However, numerous territorial issues, on-going conflict with India, 
sectarian violence between religious and political groups, domestic 
terrorism, and the ‘hornet’s nest’ of extremism has left social security 
unstable in Pakistan. According to the  Global Peace Index 2015, 
which ranks countries according to “their level of safety and security 
in society, the extent of domestic and international conflict, and the 
degree of militarisation” (IEP, 2014, p. 2), Pakistan ranks 154th out of 
162 countries and has a very low ‘state of peace’(IEP, 2014, p. 9; see 
also chapter two).  
 
Pakistan’s initial geopolitical role in the 21st Century was as a United 
States ally on the frontline in the ‘War on Terror’ in the wake of the 
11th of September, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York (Bailey & 
Immerman, 2015, p. 93). Parallel to this ‘war’ was the continued fight 
against the Taliban in Afghanistan, which rose to power in the wake 
of the Soviet withdrawal (see chapter three). Strong ethnic Pashtun 
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ties bind the 20 million Pashtuns, living within Pakistan's western 
borderlands, many of whom are refugees, with the Afghan Taliban 
(Cohen, 2014, p. 355). This has provided a gateway for the hard-line 
religious ideology underpinning the Taliban to spread into greater 
Pakistan where it manifests predominantly in attacks against minority 
Shia Muslims such as the Hazaras (Hashmi, 2009, p. 15; see also 
chapter five).  
 
The entrenched territorial dispute with India over Kashmir has 
enabled Pakistan’s military to evolve into the nation’s strongest 
institution in a country of weak institutions (Kaplan, 2008, p. 151). 
Reinforcement of the military’s control of the country’s power 
structures has destabilised it, reflected in Pakistan’s history of only 
intermittent civil governance (Zaidi, 2005, p. 5174). With the Pakistani 
Military controlling the national agenda, substantial resources have 
been siphoned from the national budget, some of which is spent on 
activities such as the development of its nuclear programme (Giunchi, 
2014, p. 2). As Kaplan (2008) notes,  
“by emasculating the rule of law, over centralizing authority, 
and allying with various religious parties, military governments 
have exacerbated the fractiousness that challenges Pakistan’s 
cohesiveness” (p. 146).  
Pakistan’s insecure borders in the FATA and Kashmir have helped 
reinforce a military-driven agenda and erode democratic government 
authority.  
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4.4 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter illustrated the historical fragile context of Pakistan since 
its establishment, and continues to exhibit in the 21st century (Bajoria, 
2009, p. 1). This chapter has discussed how contemporary Pakistan 
not only qualifies as one of the world’s most fragile states, but the 
breadth of problems confronting it could render it intractably fragile. 
Pakistan faces considerable challenges. Now more than ever, it is 
shaped by the condition of its neighbours, most notably Afghanistan 
and India, and the policies and actions of its international partners 
such as China, Iran and the United States.  
 
Pakistan’s fragility is represented by state weaknesses in the provision 
of service entitlements to citizens, and lack of state legitimacy and 
government authority. Pakistan faces a number of fundamental 
challenges; some of which are residual from Partition, such as the 
conflict and diplomatic rift with India over Kashmir (Chester, 2009, p. 
7). Some challenges have become entrenched over time, such as crises 
related to domestic energy, political corruption, national debt, the 
threat of natural disasters, and of course the long-time presence of 
Afghan refugees (see chapter three).  
 
In conclusion, many of Pakistan’s weaknesses in all three of these 
areas can be attributed to the undemocratic foothold of the military in 
its economic and governance structures. Pakistan’s military (and 
supporting civilian elites) have become entrenched in national politics 
and economy to such an extent that it has a pervasive and negative 
impact on the factors of public service entitlement, government 
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legitimacy and authority failures used in this chapter to frame 
Pakistan’s fragility. The monopoly, over-centralisation, and 
mismanagement of resources; power consolidation through 
corruption and manipulation of legal and democratic processes has 
amalgamated to erode public trust in authority, delegitimise governing 
regimes, destroy confidence in institutions, and compromised the 
state’s ability to efficiently safeguard and mobilise resources. As a 
result, mistrust between groups has damaged social cohesion, leaving 
Pakistan in an enclosed cycle of fragility. 
 
Having explored the contexts of Pakistan as a ‘fragile host’ above, and 
Afghan forced migration (chapter three), the following chapter will 
examine some of the specific connections between Afghan refugees 
and the fragility of their hosts, Pakistan by way of a document 
analysis.  
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
Document Analysis: the Solutions Strategy for 
Afghan Refugees and Participatory Needs 
Assessment of Afghan Refugees in Balochistan 
 
5.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
After concluding a detailed background case-study review in the 
previous two chapters, this chapter provides an analysis of two 
relevant United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
documents which provide an insight into the effects of Pakistan’s 
state fragility upon its resident Afghan refugees.  
 
This analysis will explore three key aspects of this study: Pakistan as a 
‘fragile host’ to Afghan refugees; the potential sustainability of 
settlement and integration of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and the 
international support for Pakistan as refugee host.  
 
As discussed in chapter four above, Afghan refugee protection is 
undertaken by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in 
partnership with the Government of Pakistan. The UNHCR works to 
ensure that basic protection needs are met along with access to basic 
services and determines refugee status on behalf of the Government 
of Pakistan and assists in consideration of refugee legislation (United 
Nations Pakistan, 2015b, p. 1). These operations also include the 
facilitation of voluntary refugee return to Afghanistan along with 
third-country resettlement for the most vulnerable. 
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After prefacing the suitability and credibility of the chosen documents 
and outlining my method of analysis, I will analyse the two documents 
and present a narrative of the results along with some possible 
explanations and interpretations.  
 
5.2 Document Selection and Suitability 
 
In order to explore the relationship between state fragility and the 
hosting of refugees in the context of Afghan refugees in Pakistan; two 
documents have been selected for analysis. These are both official 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
documents pertaining to the management of Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan and are obtainable from the UNHCR website.  
? UNHCR. (2014). Participatory Needs Assessment of Afghan Refugees 
in Balochistan 2014. Quetta: UNHCR7.  
 
? UNHCR. (2015). Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees, Regional 
Overview: Update 2015-2016. Geneva: UNHCR8. 
 
These two documents can be seen as representing opposite ends of a 
spectrum regarding UNHCR protection of Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan. The first document is an update of the regional overview for 
the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (2015) and represents a 
                                              
7 The Participatory Needs Assessment of Afghan Refugees in Balochistan 2014 will be 
referred to as the ‘PNA’ from this point forward.  
8 The Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees, Regional Overview: Update 2015-2016 will 
be referred to as the ‘SSAR’ from this point forward.  
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high-level, multi-lateral regional strategy for working towards durable 
solutions. The SSAR was chosen as it represents a ‘top down’ key 
regional strategy aimed at ending the long running Afghan refugee 
crisis.  
 
The second document to be analysed is a Participatory Needs 
Assessment report relating to Afghan Refugees in Balochistan (2014), 
which is intended to ascertain protection shortcomings and needs of 
Afghan refugees settled in both refugee villages and urban settings. 
This assessment pertains to Balochistan, the second largest refugee 
hosting region in Pakistan (see chapter three). The PNA was chosen 
because it reflected the perceptions of the refugees themselves and 
could be considered to represent a ‘ground up’ perspective. Both 
documents are recent publications and are prefaced by nearly four 
decades of UNHCR reporting and publishing in relation to the 
Afghan refugee crisis and support for Afghan refugees. 
 
5.3 Document Analysis Method 
 
A document analysis is a qualitative investigation method that focuses 
exclusively  on secondary or existing data material, and can be 
considered “traces of social activity”, and therefore ‘data’(O'Leary, 
2014, p. 244). As Jupp (2006) explains, the significance of a document 
lays “in the historical circumstances of production, in their circulation 
and reception of the item, and also the social functions, 
interpretations, effects and uses that may be associated with them” (p. 
79). One precondition of a document analysis is interpretability. As 
documents represent an externalisation of the author’s or producer’s 
77 
 
mind, intentions, feelings, and expectations should be articulated 
through the document material. In order to maintain the contextual 
integrity of my chosen documents, it must be remembered that they 
were not expressly produced for my purposes (O'Leary, 2014, p. 244).  
 
Examination of the chosen documents will comprise a qualitative 
approach, recognising that “different people will interpret or ‘decode’ 
documents in various ways which may be different to the producer’s 
or ‘encoder’s’ intentions” (Jupp, 2006, p. 80).  The technique outlined 
by O’Leary (2014) will be utilised for further document analysis where 
they will be interrogated using predetermined search terms (p. 251). 
As explained in table 5.1 below, these search terms are linked via three 
themes to two of the research questions of this report back to the 
report’s aim.  
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The first step of this document analysis method will be to identify the key 
themes extrapolated form the research questions and objectives; secondly, 
specific and appropriate words or phrases which are linked to these 
research questions will be selected and treated as ‘search terms’ which will 
provide avenues for focused insight into the documents. Finally, each term 
will be searched for in each document, the number of occurrences and the 
context of the terms noted. After a brief contextual outline of each of the 
UN documents, the document analysis will be presented in order of the 
themes mentioned above in table 5.1 above. 
  
5.4. Context and Purposes of the Documents 
 
This section gives a contextual overview of the documents being analysed 
and highlights their different purposes. 
  
5.4.1 Participatory Needs Assessment of Afghan Refugees in 
Balochistan 2014 
 
The PNA is a report by the UNHCR (2014) based on an annual study 
conducted collaboratively by 13 of the UNHCR’s operational partner 
organisations to ascertain the needs and needs-gaps experienced by refugees 
in the region. Using an Age, Gender and Diversity (AGD) approach, 1,050 
refugee women, girls, men, and boys (as well as people with disabilities) 
were interviewed and had an opportunity to elaborate upon the challenges 
and problems they face (UNHCRa, 2014, p. 9). The assessment was led and 
authored in 2014 by the UNHCR Sub-Office in Quetta, Pakistan which 
oversees refugee matters in the Balochistan region of the country. The 
document was written for an audience of diverse stakeholders working 
towards refugee protection in the region and nationally at the grassroots 
and strategic levels. 
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The document covers fifteen representative urban, rural, and refugee village 
sites. Each site is assessed based on eight refugee protection themes which 
are: status of health services; status of education services; drinking water 
facility; livelihood protection; registration and documentation; community 
participation and access to information; protection risks/incidents and 
solutions proposed by persons of concern (UNHCRa, 2014, p. 9). Each 
chapter covers a refugee residential site and concludes with a table 
summarising the related needs or issues and the possible solutions proposed 
by the refugee communities. The PNA lists some key recommendations at 
the end which summarise the most pressing concerns cited by refugees. 
 
5.4.2 Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees Regional 
Overview: Update 2015-2016 
 
The SSAR is a high-level strategic document offering a perspective of the 
region affected by the Afghan refugee crisis which includes the Islamic 
Republics of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. The purpose of the SSAR is to 
offer an integrated and comprehensive agenda for co-operative 
interventions designed to facilitate the voluntary return and sustainable 
reintegration of Afghan refugees (UNHCRd, 2015, p. 8). The SSARa also 
aims to provide assistance to host countries over a number of years 
(UNHCRd, 2015, p. 8).  
 
The SSAR was authored by the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in 2015, published in August of the same year, and is 
an update to the inaugural iteration in January, 2014. Related documents 
include Country Project Portfolios for the three key stakeholder countries 
and the documents relating to Pakistan’s Refugee Affected and Hosting 
Areas Project (RAHA). 
 
The document begins with an overview of human displacement from 
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Afghanistan (UNHCRd, 2015, p. 4); then gives an overview of the SSAR as 
it relates to the support of refugee voluntary repatriation, sustainable 
reintegration and assistance to host communities (p. 8). Operationalization 
of the SSAR is also outlined (p. 20), along with an overview of the key 
elements of the 2015-2016 country portfolios of projects covering the five 
outcomes of the Strategy (p. 26). Some of the unique features of the SSAR 
are then explained (p. 32), including aspects of joint advocacy and resource 
mobilization (p. 36), and a summary of the strategy’s international financial 
requirements (p. 38). The SSAR concludes with diagrams of the partners 
working in each of the countries divided by key outcomes are presented (p. 
42).   
 
 
5.5. Theme One: Pakistan as Fragile State and Refugee 
Host 
 
This section presents the findings of the document analysis thematically 
beginning firstly with ‘Pakistan’s State Fragility as Refugee Host’, followed 
by ‘Settlement in Pakistan as an Option for Refugees’, and finally 
‘International Support for Pakistan in Protecting Afghan Refugees’. 
 
In order to analyse the first theme, the search terms ‘poverty’ and 
‘insecurity’ were selected. These terms were chosen because they provide a 
possible indication within the documents of the general socio-economic 
situation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan in the context of residing in 
Pakistan. These indications can then be linked to host state fragility, 
through lack of infrastructure and provision, or state authority as discussed 
in chapters 2 and 4. 
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5.5.1 Participatory Needs Assessment (2014) Analysis: Lacking 
Livelihood Opportunities and Endemic Poverty 
 
The search term ‘poverty’ was used to examine Pakistan as a fragile state 
and refugee host in the Participatory Needs Assessment in Balochistan 
(UNHCR, 2014), where it occurred 49 times. The context in which the 
term was mentioned varied, although ‘poverty’ was repeated in the 
document as the key reason for a number of severe difficulties facing 
Afghan refugees. For example, the UNHCR stated that despite parents 
being aware of the ill effects of child labour, poverty drives them to send 
their children to work at the expense of non-earning activities such as 
education (UNHCR, 2014, p. 11, p. 23, p. 25, p. 30, p. 37, p. 74). Children 
engaged in labour activities were found in the PNA to be widespread across 
refugee villages and was directly linked to high poverty rates among Afghan 
refugees.  This is also reflected in low education enrolment figures, and 
early dropout rates related to education (p. 10, p. 50, p. 56, p. 60). The 
absence of adequate jobs for adults and lack of vocational skills training to 
stimulate self-employment was seen reinforcing this pattern (p. 11, p. 46, p. 
51, p. 65). In the Lejay Karez refugee village, poverty was also cited as a 
reason for the early marriage of girls for dowry and security purposes as 
their opportunities to work are practically and culturally non-existent (p. 
36).  
 
Lack of livelihood opportunities for adults also reveals Pakistan’s fragility as 
refugee host where the UNHCR (2014) found in the PNA (2014) that while 
Afghan refugees were granted the right to work, but much of that work is 
taken up by children who are paid less (PNA, 2014, p. 61). Inadequate 
financial planning to create jobs and help reduce poverty, along with 
inadequate provision of basic services reaching refugees is helping to keep 
refugee children out of education and in the labour force (Putzel & Di 
John, 2012, p. xi; Stewart & Brown, 2010).  
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‘Poverty’ was also linked by the UNHCR’s PNA (2014) to difficulties for 
refugees from most villages meeting their administrative obligations, such 
as renewing their Proof of Registration (PoR) cards and registering births, 
due to the unaffordability and distance of travel (p. 12, p. 27, p. 51, p. 57). 
Lack of administrative support for refugees to meet their basic obligations 
to the host state itself indicates weaknesses in Pakistan’s services provision 
towards its people, particularly refugees (Stewart & Brown, 2010). 
 
In contrast to the above, the search term ‘insecurity’ occurred in the PNA 
just 5 times. Insecurity was ubiquitously mentioned in the context of the 
perceived need of refugee parents to protect their daughters. For example, 
refugee responses from the Surkhab Refugee Village illustrated that Parents 
fear abductions, harassment, and other such risks for their girls (p. 46). 
Insecurity was also given as a reason for Afghan refugee girls in Pashtoon 
Bagh and Ghausabab refugee settlements not to attend school due to risks 
inherent in travelling (p. 78, p. 81). In Old and New Saranan settlements, 
early marriages for girls were preferred by refugee parents to help alleviate 
poverty and insecurity; particularly perceived risks of exploitation or abuse 
which could occur as they venture outside the home (p. 46). Afghan refugee 
parents’ concerns for the safety of their girls in Baluchistan could signify 
authority weaknesses in Pakistan’s security and policing of such areas, 
which is a key marker of Pakistan’s state fragility (Stewart & Brown, Fragile 
States, 2010, p. 10).  
 
Both ‘poverty’ and ‘insecurity’ are intertwined in the case of the refugees 
belonging to Hazara tribe (see chapter two). As a Shi’a minority, the Harara 
people are at high risk of sectarian violence which also negatively impacts 
their economic activities resulting in increased poverty (p. 89). This could 
be interpreted as evidence of Pakistan’s inability to protect all people within 
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its border equally, another marker of state fragility (OECD, 2015, p. 20).  
 
5.5.2 Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (2015) Analysis: 
Poverty and Insecurity of Afghan Returnees 
 
The search term ‘poverty’ occurred only three times by the in the SSAR 
(UNHCR, 2015). It was used to explain that poverty remains endemic in 
Afghanistan (p. 11); that it is the reason for the large number of 
unaccompanied children seeking asylum (p. 6), and that through training, 
capacity building and skill development through the Refugee Affected and 
Hosting Areas Project (RAHA), the number of Afghan refugees living 
below the poverty line in Pakistan has reduced by (3%) (p. 24). One of the 
purposes of the SSAR update document is to reflect on some of the broad 
issues and key achievements of the regional solutions strategy which has 
meant a more positive approach has been applied in the production of the 
document.  Targeted projects such as the RAHA project have had some 
positive impact, however fluctuating refugee numbers have given Pakistan 
economic, social, and environmental shocks which it is unprepared, and 
under-resourced to tackle (see chapter four). 
 
The search term ‘insecurity’ occurred only five times in the SSAR 
(UNHCR, 2015) document. Its use was mainly in the context of 
Afghanistan as a major concern of returnees (p. 12), the central reason for 
new population displacements (p. 11), and the large number of 
unaccompanied children seeking asylum (p. 6). However, it was used in the 
SSAR once in the context of a possible outcome of youth unemployment, 
which could also affect Pakistan due to emerging economic difficulties 
which were discussed in chapter four.  
This section found that both the PNA (UNHCR, 2014) and SSAR 
(UNHCR, 2015) mentioned ‘poverty’ and ‘insecurity’ as a major issues 
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facing Afghan refugees. The PNA focused mostly how the issues of 
poverty and insecurity restrict refugee’s access to services, while the SSAR 
mentioned cited poverty and insecurity as barriers to refugees returning to 
Afghanistan. 
 
 
5.6 Theme Two: Settlement in Host Country as an 
Option for Refugees 
 
In order to analyse the theme of refugee settlement in host country as an 
option for refugees, the search terms ‘services’ and ‘settlement’ were 
selected because they reflect the degree of local integration which Afghan 
refugees experience in Pakistan (Jacobsen, 2001, 2). The search terms 
‘services’ and ‘settlement’ were also selected because they give a possible 
indication within the documents how the Government of Pakistan supports 
Afghan refugees to integrate. These indications can then be linked to 
considerations of settlement for Afghan refugees as a possible yet politically 
unpopular durable solution. 
 
5.6.1 Participatory Needs Assessment (2014) Analysis: Access to 
basic services and the village-urban divide 
 
Due to this PNA (UNHCR, 2014) document being a needs assessment, the 
search term ‘services’ occurred 51 times. This frequency indicates that 
better quality, and more widely available services are key needs based on 
refugees’ responses. The PNA explains that the UNHCR provides 
protection and sectorial services to refugees (p. 21). However, both refugee 
urban and village settlements surveyed by the PNA reported inadequacies 
in quality and lack of access to basic healthcare, sanitation, education, and 
documentation service provision, indicating that improvements in services 
are still required by UNHCR and its partners (p. 14, p. 21, pp. 25-26, p. 28). 
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This includes its government counterpart, the Commissionerate for Afghan 
Refugees (CAR) (p. 14). 
 
The PNA (2014) explains that planning has been difficult because the 
services provided by UNHCR are not only used by registered Afghan 
refugees, but also unregistered Afghans and locals from the host 
communities (p. 14). This illustrates the question of when international 
assistance to refugees stops and host-state provision begins? The UNHCR 
has been criticised for being a surrogate state providing parallel services by 
some theorists (Kagan, 2011, p. 27; Zaiotti, 2006, p. 350). However, as 
explained in chapter two, the economic shock to fragile host states from the 
arrival of large number of refugees’ means that international intervention 
becomes necessary. Without the international assistance which refugee 
settlement in Pakistan demands, it would not be sustainable. 
 
Health services were reported most often to be inadequate or unavailable 
by refugees in the PNA. The main issues cited include a shortage of 
medicines available in Basic Health Units (BHUs) (UNHCR, 2014, p. 9, p. 
29, p. 59, p. 72); unavailability of lady doctors in both BHUs and labour 
Room facilities (p. 72), and limited ambulance and laboratory services (p. 
22, p. 53, p. 92). In some refugee communities, health services such as 
immunization, family planning, and pre and post natal care are not available 
at all (p. 88). Afghan refugees also reported that when they attempt to 
access treatment at public hospitals, they are discriminated against by 
medical staff and the local host community who do not allow them to get 
easy access to services (p. 77). Other services identified by the PNA for 
improvement were drinking water facilities to ensure 100% access for all 
refugees (p. 10), and registration and documentation services which needed 
to be simplified (p. 95). Refugees also reported that the services at 
registration points were poor and refugees were left with only one 
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registration centre in Quetta (p. 31).  
 
The search term ‘settlement’ in the PNA (UNHCR, 2014) document 
indicated that it occurred 26 times. Afghan refugees are settled in both 
urban and rural village contexts in Pakistan; however urban-settled refugees 
are not supported by the UNHCR directly (UNHCR, 2014, p. 78, p. 84). 
For example, in urban refugee settlements, separate educational facilities are 
not provided for refugees and the majority of schools are public and fee 
charging (p. 10). Analysis of the PNA revealed that many issues facing 
refugees are common such as the lack of potential vocational institutes 
which leaves refugees without marketable skills, compelled to participate in 
unskilled labour work (p.11). 
 
The term ‘settlement’ was used in the PNA to also describe particular sites 
of data collection such as the urban settlements of Pashtoon Bagh, Hazara 
Town, Qadri Abad and Ghausabad (p. 77), and refer to proximity of 
services to refugees, such as public hospitals (p. 77), and bureaucratic 
services (p. 95). ‘Settlement’ is also used to describe particular groups of 
refugees such as Ghausabad, “comprising around 10,000 Pashtoon and 
Uzbeks” (p. 80, p. 84). The term also describes the land ownership context 
of refugee settlements, particularly Pashtoon Bagh, where local 
communities rent out the land around their settlements (p. 77).  
 
The PNA (2014) notes that compared to refugees living in refugee villages, 
those in urban settlements have more options for self-employment and 
small businesses (p. 78, p. 89). However, those from refugee village 
settlements who approach private and general public hospitals for their 
basic treatment face discrimination (p. 81, p. 86). Urban settlements are 
described in the PNA as being more tribally and ethnically diverse (p. 12), 
with the exception of Hazara Town which is predominantly tribal Hazara 
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people and the settlement is considered superior to others due to concrete 
housing with better sanitation and roads (p. 88, p. 89).  
 
The impression of settlement through an analysis of the PNA (UNHCR, 
2014) shows that despite the long-term presence of refugees, those residing 
in refugee villages are barely integrated into Pakistan’s host communities. 
Whereas, refugees based in urban settlements near the main city of Quetta 
have more opportunity to integrate due to enhanced employment chances 
and increased diversity. This difference in levels of integration and 
settlement could indicate Pakistan’s low level of commitment to fully 
absorbing Afghan refugees into its society, a critical requirement for this to 
work as a refugee solution (see chapter two). 
 
 
5.6.2 Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (2015) Analysis: 
Access to basic services and community capacity building 
 
The search term ‘services’ was used in the SSAR (UNHCR, 2015) 
document 27 times. The SSAR mentions its broad aim “to improve access 
to essential social services for refugees in all three countries it covers (p. 8) 
and ‘Outcome 2’ of the SSAR in particular is the improvement of “access 
to shelter and essential social services” (p. 27). In relation to the settlement 
of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, there was a range of contexts in which 
‘services’ was mentioned. Without using the exact terms ‘fragile’, the SSAR 
directly alludes to Pakistan’s fragility. In its chapter on assistance to host 
communities, the SSAR points out that “Pakistan hosts the second highest 
number of refugees in relation to its national economy […] and a 
considerable strain is placed on its overstretched public structures and 
services” (p. 14). On the same page, the SSAR mentions that overstretched 
resources and financial constraints, particularly outside refugee villages in 
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Pakistan has meant that essential services are more difficult to access for 
refugees (p. 14).  
 
A number of service provision achievements in Pakistan were also 
mentioned in the SSAR (UNHCR, 2015). Listed under the heading ‘Best 
Practice in Pakistan’ mass information, a helpline, and mobile phone text 
message services (SMS) were provided in support of the refugee renewal 
process (p. 18). In addition primary health care was provided to nearly 
600,000 refugees in refugee villages across three provinces through Basic 
Health Units (p. 24). Also in Pakistan, a total of 3,390 community 
organisations are now actively engaged in planning and implementing 
projects related to social services and infrastructure (p. 24). Also mentioned 
in the SSAR is the capacity building of local civil society foreseen to assist 
in the delivery of services in remote areas or places inaccessible to other 
stakeholders (p. 33). In Pakistan, the RAHA project aims to reduce the 
strain on Government-provided public services in these areas (p. 30). The 
focus on assistance to host states in the SSAR (2014) acknowledges, 
through the above-highlighted outcomes and efforts, the need for states to 
provide for settled refugees. As chapter two pointed out, the option of local 
integration through settlement requires local government commitment, 
which is encouraged by the SSAR programme which aims to bolster host 
government services.  
 
The search term ‘settlement’ only occurred once in the SSAR (UNHCR, 
2015) in relation to Pakistan to describe its partner, UN-Habitat, United 
Nations Human Settlements Programme (p. 43).  
 
This section found that the PNA mentioned 'services' often, mostly to 
highlight what services were being offered refugees and some of the 
service deficiencies experienced by them.  The SSAR mentioned 
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'services' a number of times also in range of contexts, most notably 
highlighting concerns regarding the pressures refugee numbers place on 
local services. The PNA mentioned 'settlement' mostly to describe the 
locations and features of rural refugee villages or urban settlements, 
while the SSAR did not mention ‘settlement’ besides the name of one of 
UNHCR's delivery partners. 
 
5.7 Theme Three: International Support for Pakistan 
in Protecting Afghan Refugees 
 
In order to analyse the theme of international support for Pakistan in 
protecting refugees, the search terms ‘international community’ and 
‘assistance’ were selected. These terms were chosen because they indicate 
the assistance given to Pakistan as refugee host by the international 
community. These indications can then be linked to ways in which 
international support for Pakistan in protecting Afghan refugees is either 
lacking or forthcoming, as discussed in chapter three.  
 
5.7.1 Participatory Needs Assessment (2014) Analysis: Refugee 
needs, not overarching solutions strategy 
 
Analysis of the PNA (UNHCR, 2014) showed that there were no 
occurrences of either search terms for under this theme. Neither 
‘international community’ nor ‘assistance’ was found in the document. A 
possible explanation for the omission of these terms is that as a needs 
assessment, the PNA is focused upon the concerns of refugees’ pragmatic 
needs, at their residential sites, at the time of data collection. The concerns 
of the PNA do not, therefore, extend to the strategic or international levels, 
but are solely concerned with local needs of particular refugee settlements 
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in Pakistan’s Balochistan region.  
 
5.7.2 Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (2015) Analysis: 
International Donor Contributions and Alleviating 
Refugee Host Burden 
 
The search term 'International Community' occurred in the SSAR 
(UNHCR, 2015) 15 times covering a range of contexts related to 
international help of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The SSAR has served as 
an enabling multilateral platform for consensus-building, strengthening of 
existing partnerships and engagement of new actors since 2012 (p. 8). 
However, the need for increased commitment from the international 
community recurred in the SSAR, highlighting the call for this at both The 
Tokyo Conference, and London Conference on Afghanistan (p. 12). 
Another example of this call includes a quote from António Guterres, UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees stating: "my appeal is to the international 
community to understand that this [the Afghan refugee burden] is not only 
the responsibility for Pakistan or Iran or other neighbouring countries; it is 
a collective responsibility" (UNHCR, 2015, p. 7). Pleas for renewed long-
term support, commitment, and solidarity from the international 
community towards the Afghan refugee crisis are mentioned in several 
places in the SSAR to preserve asylum space and create (p. 12, p. 18, p. 30, 
p. 37). International consensus-building around efforts to stabilise 
Afghanistan to allow refugees’ return are also part of the SSAR (p. 9). These 
are affirmed by the idea that “development projects can contribute to 
creating conditions for voluntary and sustainable return”, particularly 
community-based interventions, for example, building human capital 
through training so that skills gained abroad by refugees can help regenerate 
Afghanistan (p. 13, p. 34). The international community through the 
UNHCR and numerous NGOs has been involved in supporting Afghan 
refugees for nearly four decades (see chapter three). This support, however 
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waxes and wanes, often according to the geopolitical role played by 
Afghanistan and its neighbours at a given time. For example, at the start of 
the refugee crisis, the UNHCR was well funded to respond to the influx of 
refugees into Pakistan when Afghan soldiers were fighting the Soviet 
Union, however this funding has subsequently diminished (see chapter 
three).  
 
The search term ‘assistance’ occurred 7 times in the SSAR (UNHCR, 2015) 
as it is included as chapter two of the document and as a key aim of 
providing “assistance to host Communities” in the form of investment in 
long-term stability (p. 3, p. 8, p. 14). This assistance is multifaceted and aims 
to ease the strain upon Iran and Pakistan’s communities, some of which 
have hosted Afghan refugees for nearly 40 years (see chapter three). The 
SSAR (2015) itself explains that in 2014, Pakistan hosted the world’s second 
highest number of refugees in relation to its national economy (316 
refugees per 1 USD GDP (PPP) per capita), placing considerable strain on 
its overstretched public structures and services (p. 14). The SSAR also 
notes, with regard to their current living conditions in Pakistan, Afghan 
refugee households identified access to income/livelihood opportunities 
(22 per cent) and shelter (20 per cent) as their primary concerns, followed 
by access to healthcare (15 per cent) and water (13 per cent) (p. 11). 
Refugees’ needs not only indicate Pakistan’s fragility in the form of service 
entitlements failures, but the need for further assistance from the 
international community.  
 
The SSAR (UNHCR, 2015) also states that while the UNHCR and partners 
provide access to basic healthcare and education in the refugee villages, 
refugees living outside of these villages encounter more difficulties in 
accessing essential services due to overstretched resources and financial 
constraints (p. 12). Calls to the international community for increased 
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assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan is mainly driven by dwindling 
resources brought about by global recession, and competing priorities 
brought about by a deepening global refugee crisis (see chapter two, chapter 
two.8).  
This section found that either ‘international community’ or ‘assistance’ 
occurred in the PNA (UNHCR, 2014). It was concluded that the absence 
of these terms could be accounted for by the PNA being an immediate 
needs assessment rather than a strategic plan or vision. The search term 
'international community' occurred a number of times in the SSAR 
(UNHCR, 2015)  in a range of contexts, particularly referring to the SSAR's 
role in fostering international partnerships and calling for increased 
international financial support for Afghan refugees and their host countries. 
The SSAR also mentioned 'assistance', mostly in the context of assistance to 
host communities being one of its key aims. 
 
 
5.8 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented the results of a systematic document analysis of two 
key UNHCR documents: a Participatory Needs Assessment of Refugees in 
Balochistan (PNA) (2014), which comprises a ‘ground up’ approach 
ascertaining refugees’ needs; and the Solutions Strategy for Afghan 
Refugees (SSAR) (2015), which is a ‘top down’ international strategy aiming 
to solve the Afghan refugee crisis. The results of the analyses were 
organised under the following three themes:  Pakistan as a Fragile State and 
Refugee Host; Settlement in Pakistan as an Option for Refugees, and 
International Support for Pakistan in Protecting Afghan Refugees. The 
occurrences of six specifically chosen search terms, two terms per theme, 
were looked at in each of the documents and were analysed. Considering 
the results of the analysis above, five specific key points can be observed 
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across both the PNA and SSAR documents.  
 
The first key result is that under the theme of Pakistan as a Fragile State and 
Refugee Host, both UNHCR documents highlighted the effects of 
widespread poverty among afghan refugees. The PNA in particular linked 
endemic poverty to both lack of livelihood opportunities and specific ills 
such widespread child labour. Host state legitimacy failures around 
economic planning and resource allocation could be said stifle livelihood 
opportunities, particularly at Pakistan’s geographical margins where 
refugees reside. 
 
Secondly, both documents highlighted the insecurity on both sides of the 
Afghan-Pakistan border and the dilemma this creates for potential 
returnees. The PNA specifically mentioned parents’ perceived risks for 
refugee girls travelling to school in Pakistan. Pakistan’s authority failures 
contribute to refugees’ experiences of insecurity, while lack of registration 
and documentation facilities can be perceived as both state capacity and 
legitimacy failures. 
 
Thirdly, both documents highlighted the inadequate availability and access 
to quality basic services for refugees and the needed improvements in these 
areas being critical for better refugee management. The PNA highlighted 
the difference between experiences of refugees living in villages and those 
living in urban areas in Balochistan where, for example, urban refugees had 
better access to livelihood opportunities, but faced discrimination when 
accessing services such as healthcare. Host-state incapacity to provide basic 
services such as transport negatively affects refugees’ access to basic 
healthcare and education. 
 
Forthly, the SSAR particularly noted the need to build the capacity and 
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resilience of refugee and host communities' as a way of alleviating the host 
burden. Host capacity support is necessitated, at least in part, by the low 
absorption capacity of refugee host areas. Finally, in order to facilitate 
improve in the management of the Afghan refugee crisis in Pakistan, the 
challenge of maintaining international donor contributions needs to be met. 
 
In the concluding chapter that follows, these results will be discussed 
further as they relate to other literature drawn upon in previous chapters, 
two, three, and four. A number of conclusions and their implications will be 
offered along with ideas for further research. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  
The Relationship between Pakistan’s State Fragility 
and its Role as Host to Afghan Refugees: 
Conclusions 
 
6.1 Chapter Introduction  
 
This aim of this report was to explore the relationship between state 
fragility and the hosting of refugees. Chapter one outlined some key 
concepts regarding the current global refugee crisis such as the prevalence 
of fragile countries hosting refugees. The second chapter explored the 
literature considered pertinent to this study and noted particularly that a 
unified definition of state fragility is elusive due to its complex, multi-causal 
nature. In order to facilitate discussion and analysis of state fragility 
throughout this report, a working definitional framework of ‘fragility’ was 
formulated as the assorted failures of government legitimacy, authority, or 
the provision of adequate basic service entitlements (Stewart & Brown, 
2010, pp. 9-10; Naude, Santos-Paulino, & McGillivray, 2011).  
 
The case study context used to explore the aim above is the hosting of 
Afghan refugees by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Chapter three 
provided a context for both Afghanistan and the concomitant plight of 
Afghan refugees as being generated by endemic conflict and poverty for 
over nearly four decades. Focusing mainly on Pakistan’s fragility as a state, 
the fourth chapter contextualised Pakistan as fragile state hosting refugees 
of one of the largest and most protracted refugee situations globally. 
Chapter five outlined the document analysis of two key UNHCR 
documents which makes up the core of this report, a Participatory Needs 
Assessment of Refugees in Baluchistan (PNA) (UNHCR, 2014), and the 
Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR) (UNHCR, 2015).  
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This final chapter aims to synthesise the results from the document analysis 
in chapter five with the literature drawn upon to contextualise the main 
issues throughout this report. The following discussion aims to answer the 
research questions and objectives set out in chapter one leading to some 
conclusions and recommendations.  
 
6.2 Fight or Flight: Causes of the Refugee Influx into 
Pakistan 
 
This chapter addresses the first research question that asked what the main 
causes of Afghan refugee arrival to Pakistan are. First, the causes of refugee 
flight from Afghanistan are explained. Then the main reasons why these 
refugees are mostly found in Pakistan will be outlined.  
 
The literature in chapter three revealed that the main cause of Afghan’s 
forced migration is a series of intermittent conflicts which began in 1979 
and continue to this day. The initial conflict was the Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 which caused widespread devastation and forced the 
flight across Afghans across the border into neighbouring Pakistan and Iran 
(Grau & Cress, 2002, p. 15; Sliwinski, 1980, p. 39; Khalidi, 1991).  By the 
time the Soviet Union had capitulated and withdrawn ten years later, nearly 
6.4 million Afghans had fled, divided between Pakistan (3.3 million) and 
Iran (3.1 million) ( (UNHCR, 2015l, p. 1) (UNHCR, 2015g, p. 2) (UNHCR, 
2015, p. 2).  
 
Examination of the literature showed that the three successive conflicts that 
followed the Soviet invasion caused subsequent waves of forced migration 
and internal displacement, along with the sustained exile of Afghans already 
in Pakistan and Iran (see figure 2.3). The first of these conflicts was the civil 
war between tribes of ex-guerrilla fighters (1993-1996) (Human Rights 
Watch, 2001, p. 15); followed by war between the Taliban and Northern 
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Alliance (1996-2001) (Rashid, 2010, p. 5); and finally, the US led invasion 
which began in 2001 and continues today (Bailey & Immerman, 2015, p. 
57). Analysis of the Afghan refugee crisis since 1979 illustrated in chapter 
three showed a sharp rise in refugee registrations in Pakistan and Iran with 
the outbreak of each successive conflict (figure 3.4). This was mirrored by 
refugees returning home during interludes of relative peace, only for them 
to return to exile when conflict re-emerged (UNHCR, 2015e, p. 1; 
(UNHCR, 2002, p. 9).  
 
As explained in chapter three, the legacy of these conflicts in Afghanistan is 
continued insecurity due to the prevalence of armed groups, severe 
underdevelopment due to severely damaged infrastructure and a faltering 
economy, and endemic state fragility. Afghanistan is an archetype of the 
mutually-reinforcing processes of forced displacement, underdevelopment 
and state fragility, which are stimulated by and revolve around conflict, as 
shown in figure 2.1. The cross-sectional analysis of global indexes illustrated 
in figure 2.3 representing conflict (IEP, 2014, p. 10); underdevelopment 
(UNDP, 2015, p. 162), and state fragility (The Fund for Peace, 2015, p. 7) 
confirmed the clear link between these processes (figure 2.2). Both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan were included among the 50 worst performing 
countries in each index simultaneously, with Afghanistan being ranked 
among the very worst in each list. The mutual reinforcement of conflict, 
underdevelopment and state fragility continues to plague Afghan society, 
making the return home from Pakistan a risky proposition, which 
reinforces the protracted refugee situation (Bialczyk , 2008, p. 14). 
 
Two key reasons account for Pakistan as the principle refuge of Afghan 
forced migrants. The first is that Pakistan is the closest neighbouring 
country to Afghanistan’s two largest urban areas, Kabul and Kandahar, 
where the majority of refugees originate from (UNHCR, 2015: p. 5). These, 
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the two largest urban areas in Afghanistan were devastated by the conflicts 
mentioned above and are proximal to the most populated refugee centres in 
Pakistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Territories (FATA) province in 
Pakistan’s Northwest, and Balochistan in the Southwest respectively (see 
Figure 3.1). Figure 4.1, a map of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, shows that 
the majority of refugees are concentrated in and around the urban areas of 
Peshawar in the Northwest, and Quetta in the Southwest. The second 
reason for the largest Afghan refugee population being in Pakistan is linked 
to the legacy of Partition. Known as the Durand Line, the border between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan bears a strong geo-historical connection to the 
majority ethnic group, the tribal Pashtuns and was unsatisfactorily settled at 
the time of Partition in 1947 (Centlivres & Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p. 73; 
Qaseem, 2008, p. 93). Many Afghans consider Pakistan’s FATA region to 
be Afghan territory, although ratification of the current Afghan-Pakistan 
border (Durand Line) remains legally binding in international law (Razvi, 
1979, p. 39). Regardless, this border remains highly porous and a shared 
cross-border culture facilitates trade, livelihood, and refugee movement 
(Schmeidl and Maley, 2013, p. 131; Cohen, 2014, p. 355; Monsutti, 2008). 
 
6.3 Stretched to Breaking Point: How Pakistan Copes 
as Host to Afghan Refugees 
 
This chapter addresses the second research question that asked how 
Pakistan copes as host to Afghan Refugees. Pakistan is first contextualised 
as a fragile state, and then the general situation of Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan is described followed by a brief outline of refugee support offered 
by the Government of Pakistan.  
 
Pakistan ranks as one of the world’s most fragile states, ranked 13th most 
fragile globally (The Fund for Peace, 2015, p. 6; Puerto Gomez & 
Christensen, 2010, p. 19). As outlined in chapter four, there are numerous 
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reasons for this fragility rating, not least of all the current risks of insecurity 
and conflict on two fronts. The first major issue is war with India over 
Kashmir (Indurthy & Haque, 2010, p. 10; Kaplan, 2008, p. 151), and the 
second issue is placed along the Afghan-Pakistan border with non-state 
insurgents including Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters (Bailey & Immerman, 
2015, p. 97). As briefly examined in chapter four, Pakistan’s state fragility is 
rooted in the historical circumstances of its inauguration as a nation, which 
enabled the military to appropriate the political, economic, and resource 
distribution of the country (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 18; Kaplan, 2008, p. 155). 
Rather than being isolated, Pakistan’s fragility interlinked regionally, 
particularly through its border conflicts and the conflict-induced fragility of 
its neighbour, Afghanistan. Entrenched fragility has had a direct negative 
effect upon Pakistan’s state capacity to provide for Afghan refugees, 
particularly in urban areas where the UNHCR’s remit does not extend 
(UNHCR, 2015, p. 1).  
 
As mentioned above, this report has framed Pakistan’s state fragility in 
terms of weaknesses in state legitimacy, authority, and service entitlements. 
Pakistan’s key government legitimacy challenges stemmed from the 
historically embedded military control of state political and economic 
infrastructure (Cohen, 2004, p. 45). Successive takeovers by the Punjab-
dominated military have been detrimental to the flow of resources towards 
all other groups, including refugees (Kaplan, 2008, p. 154). Embedded 
military control has placed defence disproportionately at the heart of the 
government policy and spending agenda at the expense of other key issues, 
such as poverty and the Afghan refugee crisis (Giunchi, 2014, p. 6). Power 
by these successive governments has also been consolidation through the 
manipulation of legislation and legal infrastructure (Kaplan, 2008, pp. 155-
156). 
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This report revealed that challenges to government legitimacy in Pakistan 
such as the frequent oscillation between civilian and military governance 
creates a difficult environment for policy formulation (Kaplan, 2008, p. 
152). The effects of unformulated policy links to the analysis of the SSAR 
(UNHCR, 2015), which only now provides the first step towards a national 
refugee policy for Pakistan (p. 10). A formal Pakistani national policy 
specifically addressing the refugee crisis and rights of refugees has 
previously been absent. Pakistan has instead relied upon the out-dated 
‘Foreigner’s Order’ (1951), which confers illegal alien status upon 
unregistered refugees (Issa, Desmond, & Ross-Sherif, 2010, pp. 171-172). 
Despite the Government of Pakistan managing the registration of refugees, 
legally it relied upon the Foreigners Order (Government of Pakistan, 1951, 
p. 1), which determined that undocumented Afghan refugees were illegal 
immigrants, making them more likely targets of discrimination and 
harassment (Issa, Desmond, & Ross-Sherif, 2010, pp. 171-172) (Human 
Rights Watch, 2016, p. 1). As highlighted in chapter five, Pakistan’s 
economic planning and resource allocation weaknesses have contributed to 
stunted livelihood opportunities for both refugees and host communities 
(PNA, 2014, p. 61).  Difficulty attaining livelihoods has forced children into 
the labour market at the expense of education and has necessitated the 
implementation of refugee assistance projects such as the Refugees and 
Affected Host Areas (RAHA) project (UNDP, 2013).  
 
This report discovered that challenges to Pakistan’s authority centre on its 
inability to maintain a stable environment, enact binding legislation and 
maintain the rule of law (Kaplan, 2008, p. 146). Lack of territorial control 
stems from the Kashmir dispute mentioned above and the border instability 
in the FATA, linked to the insurgent groups such as the Taliban and the 
‘War on Terror’ alliance with the United States (Bailey & Immerman, 2015, 
p. 93). Pakistan has also exhibited weaknesses in its ability to protect all 
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residents, including refugees, due to the government’s periodic favouritism 
towards certain religious and ethnic groups and lack of centralised 
government authority (Cohen, 2014, p. 90; Kaplan, 2008, p. 155). These 
authority weaknesses have combined to give Pakistan its ‘low state of peace’ 
ranking (IEP, 2014, p. 9).  
 
Pakistan’s authority weaknesses are reflected in the document analysis, 
particularly through concerns raised in the PNA (2014) by Afghan refugees 
around their personal safety when travelling and harassment by officials (p. 
46).  Endemic poverty has meant that opportunities for refugee children’s 
education was often refused by parents in exchange for labouring activities, 
or out of fear of insecurity when travelling, particularly for Afghan girls 
(UNHCR, 2014, p. 46). Analysis of the PNA (UNHCR, 2014) also revealed 
Pakistan’s inability to protect all residents equally, particularly the ethnic 
Hazara refugees who reported communal insecurity due to sectarian risks 
related to them being a Shia-Muslim minority amongst the majority Sunni-
Muslim host and refugee communities (p. 89; Hashmi, 2009, p. 15).  
 
This report also found that Pakistan’s inability to deliver accessible, quality 
service entitlements to its population, including refugees, further illustrates 
its fragility. Lack of government spending on the provision of basic quality 
services such as health and education for its population (including refugees), 
were key limitations in government capacity (Kaplan, 2008, p. 146). The 
literature also revealed that corruption at all levels of government 
(Transparency International, 2016, p. 7), and poor planning and resource 
management affecting livelihood opportunities, were key weaknesses 
(Abbasi, et al, 2014, p. 4).  
 
Further analysis of the PNA (UNCHR, 2014) revealed Pakistan’s incapacity 
predominantly through strong evidence of a lack of availability and access 
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to basic quality services for refugees, such as healthcare and education (p. 
14). The Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR) (UNCHR, 2015) 
highlighted the strain to public structures and services placed upon Pakistan 
as host the world’s second highest number of refugees in relation to its 
national economy (316 refugees per 1 USD GDP (PPP) per capita (p. 14). 
 
In the absence of a sustainable solution for the intractable refugee situation, 
such as repatriation, capacity building of refugee and host communities to 
alleviate the host burden is now a key refugee management strategy in 
Pakistan which has been incorporated into the RAHA project mentioned 
above (p. 30). Analysis of the PNA (2014) particularly showed that the 
general situation of refugees in Pakistan is dire. Poverty is widespread and 
refugees face considerable challenges in obtaining their basic needs and 
accessing livelihood opportunities (UNHCR, 2014, p. 37). The PNA 
(UNHCR, 2014) revealed that poverty was the largest barrier to accessing 
quality healthcare (p. 59), and education and training (p.10), particularly for 
refugees in urban areas such as Quetta where UNHCR’s remit doesn’t 
extend directly (p. 78).  
 
Pakistan’s fragility can be thought of in terms of weaknesses in service 
provision, government legitimacy, and authority. Through the analysis of 
the PNA (UNHCR, 2014) and SSAR (UNHCR, 2015) documents, 
supported by authors such as Abbasi, et al (2014), Kaplan (2008), and 
Cohen (2004) Pakistan’s fragility as a state is a contributing factor to the 
impoverished, uncertain, and sometimes unsafe situation of Afghan 
refugees. 
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6.4 Either a Drip or a Waterfall: International 
Community Support for Pakistan as Afghan 
Refugee Host 
 
This chapter addresses the final research question that asked how the 
international community supports Pakistan as host to Afghan Refugees. 
 
Principle responsibility for the immediate and protracted needs of Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan rests with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) due to its global refugee protection mandate (UNHCR, 
2011b, p. 2; Schoch, 2008, p. 4). However, as Pakistan is the host and 
geographical site of all practical refugee protection activities, the 
Government of Pakistan has a critical partnership role to play; a role that it 
assumed for nearly four decades, despite its fragility and related low refugee 
absorption capacity (Safri, 2011, p. 599). The success of this partnership 
arrangement in refugee protection relies upon the observation of a number 
of important legal commitments such as that of non-refoulement 
(UNHCR, 2011b: Article 33, p. 30; Adelman, H, 2001, p. 10). Finance from 
international donors is also critical for refugee assistance and protection, 
and that of host communities (UNHCR, 2015d). As illustrated in chapter 
three, international political will and funding towards Afghan refugee 
protection and assistance in Pakistan has been determinant upon prevailing 
geopolitical considerations of donor states (Grare, 2003, p. 58). As figure 
3.4 illustrates, international donor commitment and financing aimed at 
refugee assistance had been low until the US-led invasion of Afghanistan 
beginning in 2001. The literature also showed an increase in financial 
interest during the years of the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) because of a 
geopolitical interest in weakening communism (Grau & Cress, 2002; 
Human Rights Watch, 1991). Despite the relatively strong donor 
contributions over the last four years demonstrated in figure 3.4, funding is 
a key concern in the SSAR. 
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Analysis of the SSAR revealed that the need for increased funding and 
consistent commitments from the international community was a recurring 
theme, particularly attributable to the SSAR’s critical reliance on such 
commitments (UNHCR, 2015, p. 12, p. 30). One highlighted mention 
explained that the burden should not rest solely on the host countries and 
called for renewed and sustained support from the international community 
to meet the ‘collective responsibility’ of Afghan refugee protection 
(UNHCR, 2015, p. 7). This support included consensus building around 
how best to stabilise Afghanistan through community based development 
projects so that refugees can return. The SSAR (UNHCR, 2015) was 
formulated as a quadripartite partnership strategy between the UNHCR, 
Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan that recognises the complex, interconnected 
regional significance of the refugee crisis (p. 12). Further analysis of the 
SSAR showed that bolstering international partnership commitments from 
both government and the numerous non-government organisations is a 
critical element of the strategy (p. 8). 
 
Analysis of the SSAR uncovered that ‘assistance to host communities’ is a 
cornerstone aim of the Solutions Strategy (p. 13). The SSAR noted that an 
investment in long-term stability would be required such as the 
development of human capital through projects such as skills training 
delivered to both hosts and refugees (p. 14). Community-based 
interventions like skills training delivered in Pakistan to refugees and host 
communities could open up livelihood opportunities and enable returnees 
to help regenerate Afghanistan long term (UNHCR, 2015, p. 34).  
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6.5 Report Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This research report set out to explore the relationship between state 
fragility and the hosting of refugees in the context Pakistan as host to 
Afghan refugees. Pakistan is among the most fragile states in the world 
(The Fund for Peace, 2015). The complex, multi-causal nature of Pakistan’s 
fragility has, and continues to have negative repercussions upon its capacity 
to bear its refugee burden. This report found that Afghan refugees are 
negatively affected by Pakistan’s fragility across all three fragility categories 
of government legitimacy, and authority, and provision of service 
entitlements.   
 
Challenges to Pakistan’s governance legitimacy such as periodic military 
coups have prevented it from formulating a comprehensive national refugee 
policy to benefit both refugee and host communities. In addition, poor 
financial planning has reduced livelihood opportunities, reinforcing high 
levels of refugee poverty. Pakistan’s inability to thoroughly provide basic 
service entitlements to its own citizens extends to Afghan refugees who are 
not directly assisted by the UNHCR which has kept refugee absorption 
capacity low. Authority difficulties stemming from lack of border control 
and inability to enforce law and order equally have added refugees and host 
communities’ insecurity, including discrimination by the Pakistani 
authorities themselves.  
 
This report found that Pakistan’s fragility has been a major barrier to 
Afghan refugee integration locally, despite their protracted residence. With 
insecurity and state fragility in Afghanistan being a major barrier to refugee 
return, a lack of third country resettlement options and Pakistan’s political 
aversion to local settlement, sustainable solutions to the Afghan refugee 
crisis are highly problematic. The state fragility of both Pakistan as refugee 
host and Afghanistan as homeland is conflict-driven and mutually 
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reinforces both underdevelopment and protracted refugee displacement. 
This has made Afghanistan a risky home for the now 2.6 million refugees to 
return to (UNHCR, 2015: p. 5), and Pakistan a difficult temporary home.  
 
The Afghan refugee crisis has, therefore, remained protracted, carrying with 
it tremendous regional humanitarian implications. More research is needed 
to improve understanding of the ways in which conflict-related regional, 
national, and local host state fragility affects Afghan refugees. A step 
towards this might be to focus on the SSAR (UNHCR, 2015) which 
represents the most advanced official partnership strategy, and therefore 
hope that the Afghan refugee crisis has seen. It aims to strengthen high-
level international political ties, and simultaneously assist Afghanistan to 
welcome refugees home, and support host communities in Pakistan to cope 
with the refugee burden. 
 
With regards to a deeper exploration of the relationship between state 
fragility and the hosting of refugees; in the context of Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan, a systematic tracking and monitoring of SSAR initiatives progress 
is needed. This should be designed to help all stakeholders ascertain the 
degree to which real-world improvements are made to vulnerable host 
communities in Pakistan from a state fragility perspective. The impact of 
state capacity improvements upon Afghan refugee protection could then 
inform the refinement of the SSAR, so that one day Afghan’s in Pakistan 
are empowered to return to a secure and prosperous homeland. 
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